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MEDICAID ESTATE PLANNING:
CONGRESS' ERSATZ SOLUTION FOR
LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE
The Medicaid program, established under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act of 1965,' is a jointly financed federal-state pro-
1. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965). Title
XIX of the Act officially is termed "Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs."
§ 121, 79 Stat. at 343. It is popularly known as "Medicaid."
For the seminal review of the peculiar legislative history of the Medicaid program see
ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA 19-48 (1974);
see also Rand E. Rosenblatt, Dual Track Health Care-The Decline of the Medicaid Cure,
44 U. CIN. L. REV. 643 (1975) (reviewing ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WEL-
FARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA (1974) and offering a modified political analysis). For an
excellent synopsis of this history see Kenneth R. Wing, The Impact of Reagan-Era Politics
on the Federal Medicaid Program, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1983). As Professor Wing
noted, "Medicaid has been frequently labeled as a 'sleeper,' hastily considered and not
fully understood at the time it was passed." Id. at 3 n.2. In 1965, because political eyes
were focused on the much-heralded Medicare legislation, few people noticed the addition
of the Medicaid program to the Medicare bill as part of a compromise to ensure passage.
Id. Indeed, there were no committee meetings held and very little debate is recorded
specifically discussing the provisions that created the Medicaid program. Id. Even more
astonishing, no sponsor or author of record appears for the Medicaid provisions. Id. (cit-
ing S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 289 (1965)). Yet, despite this inconspicuous
origin, Medicaid has become one of the most prominent government programs. See STAFF
OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 10 3D CONG., 2D SESS., 1994 GREEN BOOK:
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 795-97 (Comm. Print 1994) [hereinafter "1994 GREEN
BOOK"] (projecting that Medicaid outlays will reach $96.2 billion in fiscal year 1995). For a
comparable example of surprising growth see also Matthew 13:32.
The federal statute and regulations governing the Medicaid program are found at 42
U.S.C. § 1396a (1988 & Supp. V. 1993) and 42 C.F.R. §§ 430-36, 440-42, 447,455-56 (1994).
These federal rules and regulations provide to states some flexibility in the categories of
individuals covered and the scope of services provided. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1988
& Supp. V 1993) (directing the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices to promulgate regulations defining areas within which the states may regulate Medi-
caid policy); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.110 to 435.340 (detailing the finer aspects of
Medicaid policy within the domain of the states). Consistent with the federal guidelines,
each state defines its own eligibility groups; determines the types and range of services it
will provide; sets payment levels for those services; and establishes its own administrative
and operating procedures. Id.; see also Dawson v. Myers, 622 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir.
1980) (noting that as long as it complies with the requirements imposed by the Secretary, a
state has wide discretion in administering the Medicaid program), vacated on other grounds
sub. nom, Beltran v. Myers, 451 U.S. 625, 625-26 (1981) (per curiam). These state rules
typically are found within the state welfare code. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 363
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gram2 designed to pay a portion of health care costs for needy persons of
all ages.3 One of the most prominent features of Medicaid is that it pays
(McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1995) and 18 N.Y. St. Reg. § 360-1; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B
(West 1993 & Supp. 1995) and Minn. Reg. Parts 9505.0010 to 9505.0150.
Under federal law, each state is required to designate a single state agency to administer
the Medicaid program and determine finer aspects of coverage and eligibility issues. See
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1988) (requiring each state to administer the program through a
single state agency). In many states a single state agency sets policy and oversees the ad-
ministration of the Medicaid program, while county or local government agencies handle
day-to-day administration and application of the eligibility rules. Patricia Tobin, Medicaid
Basics and a Review of Amendments to Medicaid Law Under OBRA '93, in PLANNING FOR
AGING OR INCAPACITY 1994: LEGAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES at 203, 207 (PLI Est. Plan. &
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. D4-231, 1994).
2. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.1000 to 435.1011 (1994) (delineating, as Subpart K, the Fed-
eral Financial Participation in Medicaid). For an informative synopsis of the structure of
the Medicaid program, see Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37-40 (1981). The
federal contribution to Medicaid costs is known as Federal Financial Participation. Id.; see
also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (noting that the Medicaid program
"provid[es] federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of
medical treatment for needy persons"). Subpart K "specifies when, and the extent to
which, FFP [Federal Financial Participation] is available ... for Medicaid services to indi-
viduals determined eligible." 42 C.F.R. § 435.1000. Under the rules, Federal Financial
Participation is available for the administrative costs states incur in determining Medicaid
eligibility and administering the Medicaid program. 42 C.F.R. § 435.1001(a). With certain
important exceptions, Federal Financial Participation also is available for Medicaid serv-
ices provided to all eligible recipients of Medicaid. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.1002(a)(1994) (es-
tablishing FFP for medical services); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.1005 to 435.1009 (1994)
(specifying exceptions and limitations on the general rule for Federal Financial Participa-
tion). In many states, Federal Financial Participation amounts to nearly 50% of program
costs. Barbara J. Collins, Overview of Medicaid for the Aged, Blind and Disabled, in
ELDER LAW INSTITUTE 1993: REPRESENTING THE ELDERLY CLIENT OF MODEST MEANS, at
179, 184 (PLI Est. Plan. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. D-266, 1993).
In addition to sharing funding responsibilities, both the state and federal governments
develop appropriate rules and regulations for Medicaid eligibility. 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.0 to
430.104 (1994). Through statute, the federal government establishes "State plan" require-
ments that define the parameters within which the states may administer the program. 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA, pronounced "HICKFA" by cognoscenti), an agency within the Department of
Health and Human Services, promulgates regulations interpreting these federal laws.
These regulations generally are found at 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.0 to 456.725 (1994). In addition
to, and sometimes in place of, promulgating regulations through the Federal Register,
HCFA periodically issues transmittals which are reprinted in: Department of Health and
Human Services, New Developments, MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE, (CCH).
Several proposals in the current Congress portend to change Medicaid significantly into
a program of block grants to the states. If any such proposal ultimately is enacted, and
eligibility determinations fall under the aegis of the individual states, the issues discussed in
this Comment simply will become issues for the states to address in their individual
programs.
3. Although this Comment focuses on Medicaid planning by the elderly, long-term
care financing is by no means an issue confined to that age group. Rather, chronically
disabled persons of all ages receive long-term care Medicaid benefits. See UNITED STATES
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOME CARE EXPERIENCES OF FAMILIES WITH CHRONICALLY
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for the long-term health care of elderly people who cannot afford to pay
for it themselves.4 In recent years, greater than sixty percent of all U.S.
nursing home residents have relied on Medicaid to pay their entire bills.5
During 1992, state Medicaid programs spent in excess of $21 billion pro-
viding nursing home care6 to nearly 1.6 million qualified elderly Ameri-
cans.7 This amount constituted more than one-fourth of all Medicaid
ILL CHILDREN, GAO/HRD-89-73, at 20-25 (June 1989) (discussing long-term care needs of
chronically ill children generally, but without reference to Medicaid); see also Patricia
Lusk, Who's Knocking Now?: New Clientele for Nursing Homes, J. GERONTOLOGICAL
NURSING, June 1990, at 8-11 (discussing the use of nursing homes by younger persons in
need of long-term care). See generally Irving K. Zola, Aging, Disability and the Home-
Care Revolution, 71 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHAB. 93 (1990) (advocating the for-
mation of a coalition between the aging and disabled populations to promote the common
care needs of their members). But see GEORGE M. TURNER, IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS
§ 18.02, at 18-3 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that "[t]here is such a strong need to analyze the
primary issues relating to this [older] segment of the population that is growing by geomet-
ric proportions that any diversion into what are lesser questions concerning use of Medi-
caid benefits by minors or younger people seems less relevant").
4. See infra text accompanying note 8 (stating that greater than one-fourth of all
Medicaid expenditures go toward financing long-term health care for elderly persons).
5. P.F. SHORT ET AL., CENTER FOR INTRAMURAL RESEARCH, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINANCING NURSING HOME CARE: THE EFFECT OF MEDICAID ASSET
SPEND-DOWN (1991).
6. 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 1, at 807. Between 1975 and 1992, Medicaid ex-
penditures on long-term care increased at an average annual rate of 7.8%. Id. The table
from which this data is derived uses the term "Skilled Nursing Facilities" (SNFs) for nurs-
ing homes in 1992. Id. Prior to 1992, the Medicaid program had bifurcated long-term care
providers into separate categories: skilled nursing facilities and intermediate care facilities.
Id. at n.1. Statistics on intermediate care facilities include facilities for the mentally re-
tarded and other similar types of care facilities. See id. (indicating these components of
expenditures on intermediate care facilities). Accordingly, it is appropriate to utilize the
data on skilled nursing facilities for determining information about Medicaid .expenditures
on long-term health care for the elderly. See id. (utilizing this method of calculation to
determine the average annual percent change in expenditures between 1975 and 1992).
7. Id. at 808. In 1975, Medicaid provided nursing home care to approximately 1.31
million persons. Id. By 1981, this number increased to approximately 1.39 million recipi-
ents. Id. This represented an increase of approximately 70,000 recipients over a six-year
period, for an average of nearly 11,500 additional long-term care recipients per year. Id.
In 1989, approximately 1.45 million persons received Medicaid-financed long-term care.
Id. This again amounted to an increase of approximately 70,000 new recipients, but this
time over a seven-year period. Id. Thus, the number of long-term care recipients grew at a
rate of approximately 10,000 per year. Id. In 1990, the number of recipients grew to 1.46
million, consistent with the previous annual growth rate of 10,000 long-term care recipi-
ents. Id. In 1991, however, the number of long-term care recipients grew to 1.5 million,
representing a one-year increase of 40,000 recipients. Id. This trend grew exponentially in
1992 when 1.58 million individuals received long-term care benefits under the Medicaid
program. Id. This one-year growth of 80,000 long-term care recipients was greater than
the increase during the entire seven-year period between 1981 and 1989. See id. (noting
increases in the number of long-term care recipients).
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expenditures.8
One reason for the widespread reliance on Medicaid is the shortage of
financing alternatives for nursing home care. 9 Merely one percent of all
first-time nursing home residents are covered by private long-term health
care insurance.' ° Moreover, Medicare, the federal health insurance pro-
gram for the elderly and disabled, provides only short-term nursing home
benefits.11 Consequently, many members of the elderly middle-class 12
8. Id. at 807. With nursing home care expenses of the elderly consuming more than
one-fourth of all Medicaid expenditures, the issue of Medicaid Estate Planning is impli-
cated directly in the current crises faced by many states in controlling runaway Medicaid
costs. See, e.g., Bonita Brodt, Medicaid Deal Only a Beginning, CHIC. TRIB., July 14, 1994,
at 1 (Chicagoland Section) (describing legislation in Illinois designed to slow the growth of
Medicaid); Craigo Wants to Sic 'Dogs' on Medicaid, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 3,
1994, at 7A (stating that "[e]scalating Medicaid costs are going to be the most important
issue the [West Virginia] Legislature addresses next year") (quoting Senate Majority
Leader Oshel Craigo); Henry L. Davis, Medicaid 'Millstone' Grows Heavy Around County
Necks, THE BUFF. NEWS, Nov. 13, 1994, at D-1, D-12 (stating that "Medicaid ... costs are
driving the program's explosive growth. More than 40 percent of ... [Erie] [C]ounty's
budget pays for long-term and chronic care for older and disabled people, although they
represent only 7.3% of ... Medicaid recipients."); Vanessa Gallman, Idea of D.C. State-
hood Lost in Financial Woes, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 3, 1995, at 3A (noting that run-
away Medicaid costs "have contributed to a $722 million budget shortfall [in the District of
Columbia]"); Mayor and Pataki Plan $2.2B Raid on Medicaid, N. Y. POST, Dec. 26,1994, at
1 (stating, in the corresponding story on page 2, that for residents of New York City alone,
Medicaid annually provides nearly $1 billion for long-term care of the elderly with "much
of it going to middle-class and upper-middle-class senior citizens in nursing homes who
become eligible by transferring their assets to their children"); Paula Wade, For Sundquist,
Trip Won't Be All Uphill, THE COM. APPEAL, Nov. 27, 1994, at 5B (referring to the Tenn-
Care program developed by the State of Tennessee to address the "debacle of Medicaid's
runaway costs").
9. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 103D CONG., 1ST
SESS., MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS (A 1993 UPDATE)
59-60 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter "MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: 1993 UPDATE"]; see
also JOAN M. KRAUSKOPF ET. AL, 1 ELDERLAW: ADVOCACY FOR THE AGING § 11.1, at 376
(2d ed. 1993) (stating that "[m]iddle-class interest in Medicaid has grown because long-
term care insurance is not provided effectively anywhere else").
10. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: 1993 UPDATE, supra note 9, at 60.
11. Id. at 59. Medicare benefits generally are restricted to the coverage of costs associ-
ated with recovery from an acute hospital stay. See id. Generally, Part A of Medicare,
Hospital Insurance, covers a limited period of nursing home costs if admission to the nurs-
ing home occurs within 30 days of the individual's discharge from a hospital stay of three
days or more. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(i) (Supp. V 1993). But this coverage expires after 100
days of nursing home care. § 1395d(a)(2)(A). For a more comprehensive explication of
the requirements under Part A of Medicare, Hospital Insurance, see 42 U.S.C. § 1395x
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also 42 C.F.R. § 409 (1994) (discussing hospital insurance bene-
fits under Medicare); KRAUSKOPF, supra note 9, at 435.
12. The "middle-class" elderly faced with the prospect of depleting their entire life
savings paying for nursing home care are those who have "managed to accumulate assets
from, say, $100,000 to $400,000 or so, over and above the home... since such families are
too 'rich' to qualify for Medicaid benefits, but too poor to be able to sustain long term
nursing home costs without going bankrupt." BRIAN BURWELL, SYSTEMETRICS, MIDDLE-
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deplete their entire life savings by paying for nursing home care until they
become impoverished and can qualify for Medicaid. 3 This process com-
monly is referred to as "spending down" to Medicaid eligibility.14
As elderly citizens become aware of these inauspicious effects of long-
term nursing home care,'15 many seek professional advice to protect their
assets in the event they will need long-term care.' 6 This practice, known
CLASS WELFARE: MEDICAID ESTATE PLANNING FOR LONG-TERM CARE COVERAGE 7
(1991) (alteration in original) (quoting ALEXANDER BOVE, THE MEDICAID PLANNING
HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE ASSETS OF MASSACHUSETrS FAMILIES (1990));
see also Linda Koco, What Planners Look For in LTC Policies, NAT'L UNDERWRITERS,
Sept. 11, 1989, at 9 (stating that the purchase of long term care insurance probably is not an
economically sound decision for those with non-exempt assets of less than $150,000, thus
implicitly suggesting that those with assets above this amount are the middle class individu-
als that are "pinched" under the current system).
13. With annual average nursing home costs nearing $40,000, long-term health care
expenses quickly can dissipate the entire lifetime savings of an elderly individual. See 140
CONG. REC. S5834 (daily ed. May 17, 1994) (statement of Sen. Cohen) (noting this average
cost in remarks introducing S. 2122, The Public-Private Long Term Care Partnership Act of
1994). In urban centers, the cost of nursing home care can rise to twice the average and
decimate one's lifetime savings practically overnight. See Vernon Loeb, U.S. Decries Care
at D.C. Village, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1995, at Al (noting an $87,000 per year rate at a
municipal, "no-frills" nursing home in Washington, D.C.).
14. An essential distinction must be made between this use of the term "spend down"
and an alternative use of the term describing the practice of divesting one's resources on
expenditures other than health care costs for the purpose of appearing impoverished and
qualifying for Medicaid. See infra text accompanying notes 15-18 (describing the practice
of "spend-down" through planned divestiture of assets). The former is a clearly legitimate
practice. See infra text accompanying notes 25-28 (describing this type of spend-down and
coverage of the "medically needy"). The latter is a highly controversial practice analyzed
in-depth in this Comment. See infra text accompanying notes 15-18 (defining the practice
of Medicaid Estate Planning); see also discussion infra part I (describing the financial re-
quirements for Medicaid eligibility and past congressional attempts to limit Medicaid plan-
ning); part II (reviewing the recent congressional efforts, enacted in OBRA '93, attempting
to reduce Medicaid planning); part III.A (analyzing these most recent efforts); part 1II.B
(discussing the conditions that cause many people to utilize Medicaid planning as a means
to finance long-term care needs while still preserving reasonable levels of assets); and part
IV (advocating the creation of a system integrating long-term care insurance and Medicaid
as a means to both limit Medicaid fraud and provide the elderly with a dignified option for
financing long-term care).
15. Concededly, elderly individuals approach the twilight of life anxious about a vari-
ety of issues, including "physical and mental decline, functional impairment and depen-
dence on others, diminishing opportunities to pursue enjoyable and fulfilling activities, and
inevitable loss of family members and friends." Marshall B. Kapp, Options for Long-Term
Care Financing: A Look to the Future, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 719, 719 (1991). Nonetheless,
"[in the contemporary United States, financial impoverishment, with its attendant restric-
tions on lifestyle and its dampening of an elder's ability to leave a significant financial
inheritance to her heirs, is perhaps the most feared result of the aging process." Id.
16. See Esther B. Fein, Welfare for Middle-Class Elderly?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994,
at 39 (stating that "[flor the last several years, thousands of middle-income elderly people
... have transferred their assets ... to qualify for Medicaid"). An exceptionally poignant
example of the events that lead to Medicaid planning and the ease with which it is some-
Catholic University Law Review
as Medicaid Estate Planning, is a process by which individuals shelter or
divest their assets to qualify for Medicaid without first depleting their life
savings. 17 In recent years, more elderly individuals have taken advantage
of this long-term care financing option. 8
times executed was provided in a true story shared during testimony prior to congressional
action on OBRA '93:
In February 1992, an elderly man came into the local Medicaid eligibility office to
make a Medicaid application on behalf of his female cousin, who was in a nursing
home. His cousin was the beneficiary of an irrevocable family trust with a princi-
pal value of approximately $1.5 million. Although she was the trust beneficiary,
the income generated from the trust was placed in a joint bank account, which she
and her cousin jointly held. The balance in the account was approximately
$279,000. A few days before coming to the Medicaid eligibility office, the man
had made a withdrawal of $184,000, leaving $95,000 in the account. Seeing this
fund balance, the eligibility worker informed the man that his cousin was not
eligible for Medicaid. At that point, the man wrote himself another check on the
account for $93,000, leaving a balance of $2,000. "Is she eligible now?" he said.
"Yes, she is," the eligibility worker replied.
Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (1993) (statement of Brian 0. Burwell, Division Manager for Sys-
teMetrics/MEDSTAT Systems) [hereinafter Hearings].
17. See BURWELL, supra note 12, at 11. Medicaid planning is not an intergenerational
issue. Id. at 13. Very few elderly are "looking for free rides at taxpayers' expense." Id. at
12. In fact, the elderly rarely initiate these planning activities themselves. Id. Rather, they
usually are prompted by an applicant's children, attempting to maximize their inheritances.
Id. at 12-13. Cf Kapp, supra note 15, at 719 (suggesting that it is actually the elderly
themselves who are motivated by the unselfish desire to leave a significant financial inheri-
tance to heirs). Thus, while taxpayers suffer from the effects of Medicaid Estate Planning
through greater Medicaid expenditures, the financial beneficiaries of Medicaid planning
are not usually the elderly themselves, but their future heirs. BURWELL, supra note 12, at
13.
18. The only empirical evidence of Medicaid Estate Planning comes from a study by
the General Accounting Office reviewing a random sample of 403 Medicaid applications
for nursing home benefits in Massachusetts. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDI-
CAID ESTATE PLANNING, GAO/HRD-93-29R. GAO found that more than half of these
applicants had either converted available assets into exempt assets, or had transferred as-
sets to another person within the 30-months prior to their application. Id.
Aside from this limited study, most evidence is purely anecdotal. See Hearings, supra
note 16, at 338 (statement of Brian 0. Burwell, Division Manager for SysteMetrics/MED-
STAT Systems). Nonetheless, this anecdotal evidence overwhelmingly indicates that
Medicaid Estate Planning is widespread. Id. Attorneys who have established entire prac-
tices on their expertise in this field frequently provide the elderly with free seminars on
Medicaid Estate Planning. Id. Major newspapers, magazines, books, and even home
videos have examined this practice extensively. Id.; see, e.g., Fein, supra note 16, at 39
(noting that "[tihe practice has created a swelling corps of lawyers who help people to
pauperize themselves legally [in order to qualify for Medicaid]"); ALEXANDER BOVE, THE
MEDICAID PLANNING HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE ASSETS OF MASSACHU-
sEfrs FAMILIES (1990); Melinda Beck et al., Planning to Be Poor, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 30,
1992, at 66; Laura Sanders, The King Lear strategy, FORBES, Dec. 9, 1991, at 164; Jane
Bryant Quinn, Do Only the Suckers Pay?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 18, 1989, at 52; see also Hear-
ings, supra note 16, at 362 (statement of Sheldon Goldberg, representative of the Ameri-
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Medicaid Planning
This Comment examines the Medicaid eligibility rules that allow many
people to shelter thousands of dollars worth of assets in order to qualify
for taxpayer-financed long-term health care benefits, while requiring
others to deplete their entire life savings to receive the same assistance.
This Comment first details the sundry eligibility requirements for Medi-
caid recipients, focusing on the financial eligibility requirements under
the "Medically Needy" category. It then reviews previous congressional
initiatives designed to prevent individuals from qualifying for Medicaid
fraudulently through a process of planned divestiture. Next, this Com-
ment details the significant changes to these eligibility rules implemented
as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. This detailed
review is followed by an analysis of the extent to which the current sys-
tem can be expected to forestall this form of Medicaid fraud, noting spe-
cific provisions that are flawed. Finally, this Comment concludes that,
while the recent amendments close many loopholes in the law and make
it more difficult for individuals to utilize Medicaid Estate Planning, the
legislation fails to address the underlying problem prompting Medicaid
planning - the lack of long-term care financing options. Indeed, this
Comment argues that, by precluding expansion of integrated public-pri-
vate partnerships for financing long-term care, the recent legislation trag-
ically frustrates development of this most viable option for supplanting
Medicaid planning with responsible, dignified alternatives for financing
long-term health care.
I. FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY
A. Classifications of Medicaid Eligibility
Individuals may qualify for Medicaid under three general classifica-
tions.19 First, federal law requires that states cover all persons who are
can Association of Homes for the Aging) (exhibiting a home video entitled WHAT, ME PAY
FOR NURSING HOME COSTS?). Indeed, demand for these services is so great that computer
software programs assisting in Medicaid planning are available on the market. See BOVE,
supra at 342-44 (providing an example of a computer software brochure advertising "Trust
Plus Medicaid an Irrevocable Medicaid Trust System for drafting irrevocable trusts to
avoid potential nursing home costs through asset divestment").
19. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.100 (1994) (regarding qualification under the Categorically
Needy classification); § 435.200 (regarding qualification under the Optionally Categorically
Needy classification); § 435.300 (regarding qualification under the Medically Needy classi-
fication). In addition to qualifying for Medicaid under one of these three classifications,
the federal government prescribes to the states certain general requirements with respect
to all Medicaid recipients. §§ 435.400 to 435.541. For example, no state may establish an
age requirement greater than 65 years of age. § 435.520. In addition, the citizenship re-
quirement dictates that participating states must provide Medicaid to all citizens of the
United States, lawfully admitted permanent residents, and all persons residing here under
color of law, if they are otherwise eligible. § 435.406. Generally, in determining whether
1995] 1223
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"categorically needy.",2 1 Within this definition are recipients of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and most aged, blind, and
disabled persons receiving assistance through the Supplemental Security
21Income (SSI) program.
Second, the "optionally categorically needy" category permits states to
extend Medicaid coverage to needy individuals from a number of other
an individual qualifies as "disabled," states must use definitions established by the federal
government. §§ 435.540 to 435.541. Finally, under the residency rules, states are required
to provide Medicaid to all qualified residents of the state. § 435.403(a). Generally, the
state of residence is the state in which the individual is residing with the intention to re-
main either permanently or for an indefinite period. § 435.403(i). Accordingly, institution-
alized individuals may not be denied Medicaid based on the fact that residency was not
established before institutionalization. § 435.4030)(2).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.100 to 435.170
(1994). Note, however, that Arizona does not operate a traditional Medicaid program and
is not subject to this requirement. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: 1993 UPDATE, supra note 9,
at 418-19. Rather, since it was granted a demonstration waiver in 1982, Arizona has oper-
ated a federally-assisted medical assistance program of its own design. Id.; see also Eliza-
beth Andersen, Administering Health Care: Lessons from the Health Care Financing
Administration's Waiver Policy-Making, 10 J.L. & POL. 215, 229 n.67 (1994) (describing
HCFA's waiver for Arizona's system).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.121 to
435.138 (1994) (providing a complete description of the other types of individuals that may
be categorically eligible, depending on other programs offered by the state).
The Supplemental Security Income system, established in the Social Security Act
Amendments of 1972 to replace former cash assistance programs for the aged, blind, and
disabled, provided higher income and resource eligibility standards. Social Security Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 1611, 86 Stat. 1329, 1466. Concerned that mandating Medicaid
coverage for the additional individuals that would then be eligible for Medicaid would
discourage states from participating in the Medicaid program, Congress elected to allow
states to continue utilizing the SSI standards that were in effect on January 1, 1972 for the
purposes of Medicaid eligibility. § 209(b), 86 Stat. at 1381 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f)
(1988)); see Savage v. Toan, 795 F.2d 643, 644-46 (8th Cir. 1986) (discussing the back-
ground and purpose of § 209(b)). States electing this option are known as "209(b) states"
for the section of the Act which provided this option. See, e.g., KRAUSKOPF, supra note 9,
§ 11.12, at 379-80 (discussing mandatory coverage of persons who qualify for Medicaid);
Barbara J. Collins, Medicaid, in ELDER LAW INSTITUTE 1994: REPRESENTING THE ELD-
ERLY CLIENT OF MODEST MEANS, at 99, 104 (PLI Est. Plan. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. D-235, 1994); 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 1, at 785. There are 12
Section 209(b) states: Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia. Id. For an
exceptionally clear presentation of issues and rules arising in 209(b) states, see ADVISING
THE ELDERLY CLIENT §§ 29:6, 29:12 (Louis E. Mezzullo et al. eds., 1993).
Finally, included within the categorically needy are those individuals who became ineligi-
ble for SSI because of the cost of living increases for eligibility enacted in the so-called
"Pickle Amendment" in 1977. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-566, § 503, 90 Stat. 2667, 2685-86 (1976); see Collins, supra at 104. For a more
detailed review of this area of eligibility, see A Quick and Easy Method of Screening for
Medicaid Eligibility Under the Pickle Amendment, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1219 (1991).
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specific groups.22 If a state chooses to extend benefits to one of these
groups, the state must extend the benefits to all eligible individuals within
that group.23 Furthermore, if a state provides this form of Medicaid cov-
erage, it must provide the same benefits to these individuals as it grants to
categorically needy persons.
24
Finally, states may choose to extend Medicaid to the "medically
needy."-2 5 These are individuals whose income, while too high to qualify
them as categorically needy, is reduced by such large medical expenses
that their available income effectively equals the income of categorically
needy individuals.2 6 In other words, an individual who is not categori-
cally needy may qualify for Medicaid if she27 can prove that, due to large
medical expenditures, she has "spent-down" her resources to the level of
the categorically needy.28
Procedures for determining financial eligibility vary among these three
categories. Tautologically, individuals who are categorically needy con-
22. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.200 to 435.236 (1994). The optional groups include: individuals
receiving optional state SSI supplements, but not federal SSI payments, § 435.234, resi-
dents of nursing homes or other specified institutions who would otherwise be eligible for
cash assistance, § 435.211, persons receiving-home or community-based services, § 435.217,
and institutionalized individuals whose income does not exceed 300% of the federal SSI
payment level, § 435.236.
23. 42 C.F.R. § 435.201(b) (1994). This section provides that "[i]f the [state] agency
provides Medicaid to any individual in an optional group . . .the agency must provide
Medicaid to all individuals who apply and are found eligible to be members of that group."
Id.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 42 C.F.R. § 435.201(b) (1994).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.300 to 435.350.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a); see also 42 C.F.R. § 435.301(a)(1)(ii) (stating that an
agency may provide Medicaid to individuals with income greater than the amount allowed
under the standard for categorical eligibility, if they have incurred medical expenses at
least equal to the difference between their income and the applicable income standard).
27. Because aging is the single biggest risk factor for needing long-term care, and be-
cause women tend to outlive men, the majority of long-term care recipients are female.
See Kapp, supra note 15, at 719, n.2 (citing STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING,
101ST CONG., 2D SESS., AGING AMERICA: TRENDS AND PROTECTIONS 10 (Comm. Print
1990); Robert L. Kane & Rosalie A. Kane, Long-Term Care, GERIATRIC MED. 648-53 (2d
ed. 1990) (noting these facts in rationalizing the use of female pronouns throughout a re-
lated article). Therefore, throughout this Comment, female pronouns are used in referring
to long-term care recipients.
28. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.800 to 435.845 (1994) (detailing specific eligibility requirements
that the states may implement for the medically needy). These sections include provisions
mandating that eligibility requirements account for the number of dependents the appli-
cant supports. § 435.811(b). In addition, these regulations require that states decide on a
single standard for determining eligibility as medically needy, and provide examples of
schemes that satisfy this requirement. § 435.8. Finally, it is important to note that because
these sections allow any "incurred medical expenses" to be deducted against income for
the purpose of establishing eligibility as medically needy, both paid and unpaid medical
bills may serve as proof of "spend-down." § 435.831(c)-(d).
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clusively qualify for Medicaid by virtue of their eligibility for AFDC or
SSI. 29 Similarly, there are very straightforward and mechanical financial
requirements for optionally categorically needy individuals. 30 In contrast,
applicants under the medically needy classification are not subjected to
any previous means test.31 Therefore, complex financial eligibility rules
exist for qualifying under the medically needy classification.32
B. Financial Requirements for the Medically Needy
To determine the eligibility of an applicant under the medically needy
category, states analyze the income 33 and resources34 of the individual in
light of federal standards. 35  With respect to both income and resources,
federal law provides that in determining Medicaid eligibility a state may
count only those amounts that are available to an individual.36 Accord-
29. See 45 C.F.R. Part 233, Coverage and Conditions of Eligibility in Financial Assist-
ance Programs (1994) (detailing the means test required for AFDC eligibility); 20 C.F.R.
Part 416 Subparts K (Income) to L (Resources and Exclusions) (1994) (detailing the means
test required for SSI eligibility); see also supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (noting
that categorically needy individuals are those receiving AFDC and SSI).
30. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (describing the various circumstance
under which an individual may qualify for Medicaid as "optionally categorically eligible").
31. Compare supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (noting that categorically
needy applicants have been previously subjected to a means test upon application for
AFDC or SSI) and supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (demonstrating that means
testing for optionally categorically needy applicants is rather mechanical, as it directly re-
lates to eligibility standards for SSI) with supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (noting
that applicants under the medically needy category are subjected to a specific means test as
part of the Medicaid application procedure only).
32. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the means test for Medicaid
eligibility for the medically needy).
33. Generally, all earned and unearned income, unless specifically exempted or disre-
garded, is counted to determine Medicaid eligibility. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.811(a) (1994)
(requiring states to determine eligibility using a single income standard meeting the provi-
sions). This income standard is indexed to account for different family sizes. § 435.811(b).
34. All liquid and non-liquid assets not specifically exempted may be included in the
calculation of a Medicaid applicant's resources. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.840 (1994) (setting
forth the requirements of the medically needy resource standard). The resource standards
also account for differences in family size. § 435.840(d). As with most of the means tests
within the Medicaid eligibility rules, this standard also may vary based on differences in the
costs of shelter in urban and rural areas. See § 435.811(f).
35. For income, these standards are listed at 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.811 to 435.832 (1994).
For resource levels, these standards can be found at 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.840 to 435.845 (1994).
Under the most recent changes to the law, the terms "income" and "resources" are re-
placed by the term "assets." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see infra note 88
and accompanying text (describing this change in the law).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This concept, known as the
"availability principle," is derived from the 1939 Amendments to the Social Security Act.
See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 302(a)(7), 53 Stat.
1360, 1379 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). As the Supreme
Court noted, the availability principle is designed "primarily to prevent the States from
1226
Medicaid Planning
ingly, federal regulations require that "income and resources are consid-
ered available both when actually available and when the applicant or
recipient has a legal interest in a liquidated sum and has the legal ability
to make such sum available for support and maintenance. 37
In defining the conditions under which an applicant maintains a legal
interest in property, Congress has developed extensive rules governing
the transfer, expenditure, divestiture, or conversion of income and re-
sources to qualify for Medicaid.38 Invariably, as states have implemented
these provisions, the Medicaid Estate Planning industry has developed
schemes to circumvent the law.39 Consequently, Congress has continued
to amend eligibility rules in an attempt to restrict the ability of elderly
persons to shelter assets and qualify for Medicaid."
C. The Evolution of Efforts to Police Planned Divestiture
1. Early Legislation Regarding Asset Transfers
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980 (OBRA '80), 4'
Congress made its first significant attempt to police asset transfers.42
conjuring fictional sources of income and resources by imputing financial support from
persons who have no obligation to furnish it or by overvaluing assets in a manner that
attributes nonexistent resources to recipients." Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 200
(1985). For a more detailed historical review of the availability principle, see Elizabeth C.
Kolshorn, The Effect of the Federal Availability Principle on State AFDC Asset-Transfer
Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 583-85 (1989) (discussing federal eligibility standards and
the availability principle).
37. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1994); see Couch v. Director, Mo. State Div. of
Family Serv., 795 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding a decision that the res of a
self-settled trust created to qualify an individual for Medicaid constitutes an "available"
resource). But see Tidrow v. Director, Mo. State Div. of Family Serv., 688 S.W.2d 9, 12-14
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a discretionary trust, authorizing but not requiring the
trustee to distribute sums to the beneficiary as the trustee deems necessary, is not consid-
ered available).
38. See infra notes 41-72 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the history of
congressional efforts to police transfer, expenditure, divestiture, and conversion of assets to
establish Medicaid eligibility).
39. See BRIAN BURWELL, SYSTEMETRICS, STATE RESPONSES TO MEDICAID ESTATE
PLANNING 1-2 (1993) (noting that, despite congressional efforts to restrict Medicaid plan-
ning, the practice has continued to grow, due in part to "a dramatic expansion in knowl-
edge and techniques ... on how to make the assets and income of prospective Medicaid
applicants 'unavailable' during the Medicaid application process"); see also supra note 18
(noting the widespread presentation of free seminars instructing individuals how to shelter
assets, newspaper and magazine articles discussing Medicaid planning, and even books and
home videos instructing individuals how to shelter assets effectively).
40. See discussion infra part I.C (reviewing past congressional efforts in this regard).
41. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566
(1980) (relevant portions codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (1988)).
42. § 5(b), 94 Stat. at 3568. The relevant provisions specifically denied SSI benefits to
individuals who transferred assets for less than fair market value to qualify, and gave states
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The specific provisions, known as the Boren-Long amendment,43 gave
states the option of denying Medicaid to persons who transferred "count-
able"' 44 assets for less than fair market value within the previous
twenty-four months.45 Depending on the uncompensated value trans-
ferred, states could render applicants ineligible for up to twenty-four
months.46
Subsequent to OBRA '80, in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 (TEFRA '82), 47 Congress expanded the scope of the transfer
provisions by permitting states to consider transfers of any "excluded '48
assets within the previous twenty-four months, as well as transfers of
"countable" assets during that time period, in determining Medicaid eligi-
bility.49 In addition, Congress granted states the option, under certain
conditions, to impose liens on the homes of institutionalized individuals
as a means of eventually recovering Medicaid expenditures made on their
the option of extending this provision to Medicaid eligibility determinations. See id. (pro-
viding that "an individual who would otherwise be eligible for medical assistance under
[Medicaid] may be denied such assistance if such individual would not be eligible for such
medical assistance but for the fact that he disposed of resources for less than fair market
value"). This option became mandatory under the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of
1988 (MECCA '88), which required states to adopt asset transfer penalty provisions as a
condition for federal financial participation in the state's Medicaid program. See Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 303(b), 102 Stat. 683, 760 (en-
acting this requirement); see also infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing this
and other relevant provisions enacted as part of MECCA '88). For a pointed explanation
of the concept of federal financial participation, see supra note 2.
43. See Lewis v. Hegstrom, 767 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985) (referring to these
provisions as the Boren-Long amendment); see also BURWELL, supra note 12, at 11 (same).
44. This term refers to assets which are "counted" in the financial eligibility determi-
nation, in contrast to those which are "excluded." See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1210 (1994) (listing
items to be excluded in making a resource determination). For example, "excluded" assets
include a reasonable amount of personal property, life insurance up to a certain face value,
an auto below a certain value, burial space, a limited amount of funds set aside for burial,
and one's home so long as it remains one's primary place of residence. Id.
45. The legislation specifically provided:
In determining the resources of an individual (and his eligible spouse, if any)
there shall be included ... any resource (or interest therein) owned by such indi-
vidual or eligible spouse within the preceding 24 months if such individual or
eligible spouse gave away or sold such resource or interest at less than fair market
value of such resource or interest for the purpose of establishing eligibility for
benefits or assistance under this Act.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. at 3567.
46. § 5(b), 94 Stat. at 3568. The legislation did allow states to provide for periods of
ineligibility to last for more than 24 months where the value of the resources disposed
exceeded $12,000 and the period was directly related to the uncompensated value. Id.
47. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
48. See supra note 44 (distinguishing between "excluded" and "countable" assets).
49. See § 132(b), 96 Stat. at 372 (amending the rules on transfer of the applicant's
home).
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behalf.5° TEFRA '82 expressly prohibited states from foreclosing these
liens, however, if a spouse, dependent child, or other primary caregiver
still lived in the home.
51
Congress further amended these asset transfer rules in the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MECCA '88).52 First, MECCA '88
mandated that all states adopt the transfer restrictions made optional
under prior measures.5 3 Second, it extended the "look-back" period for
asset transfers from twenty-four to thirty months, so that any transfers
made within the thirty months preceding application would be considered
available resources for Medicaid eligibility determinations.54 Third, it ex-
empted non-institutionalized Medicaid applicants from the transfer
rules.55 Finally, MECCA '88 required that all countable assets held by
the applicant and his or her spouse be totaled and divided equally be-
tween them for the purpose of determining the applicant's available as-
50. § 1917(a)(2), 96 Stat. at 370-71 (amending Title XIX to provide for limited liens).
The Committee report clearly articulated the purpose of this measure:
The amendment intends to assure that all of the resources available to an institu-
tionalized individual, including equity in a home, which are not needed for the
spouse or dependent children, will be used to defray the costs of supporting the
individual in the institution. In doing so, it seeks to balance the government's
legitimate desire to recover its Medicaid costs against the individual's need to
have the home available in the event discharge from the institution becomes
feasible.
1982 Amendments: Committee Reports and Supplementary Material, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES NEWS RELEASE, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE, NEW
DEVELOPMENTS (CCH) 24,559 (1982).
51. § 132(b), 96 Stat. at 370-71 (limiting the imposition of liens on one's home if cer-
tain persons legally reside therein).
52. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683.
53. § 303(b), 102 Stat. at 760-61 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)); see supra note 42.
Prior to the enactment of MECCA '88, states varied in their treatment of asset transfers
for less than fair market value made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. For a
state-by-state discussion of asset transfer rules prior to enactment of the Medicare Cata-
strophic Coverage Act of 1988, see NEUSCHLER, NATIONAL GOVERNORS' Assoc., MEDI-
CAID ELIGIBILITY FOR THE ELDERLY IN NEED OF LONG TERM CARE (1987)) (cited in
BURWELL, supra note 39, at 11).
54. § 303(b), 102 Stat. at 761.
55. Id. (applying the provision's rules to "institutionalized" individuals only). Appar-
ently, this provision was based on the assumption that Medicaid benefits for the non-insti-
tutionalized elderly are less valuable than nursing home benefits and, therefore, there is
much less incentive to transfer assets to qualify. But see 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(C)(ii)
(Supp. V 1993) (allowing states to apply the transfer rules to "other long-term care services
for which medical assistance is otherwise available under the State plan").
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sets. 56 Accordingly, transfers between spouses were exempted, up to
certain defined amounts, from the transfer rules.
57
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA '89),58
Congress enacted a technical correction to MECCA '88 by restricting as-
set transfers by an applicant's spouse.59 This change closed a major loop-
hole that had allowed an applicant to transfer assets to his or her spouse,
who then transferred the assets to someone else without penalty.6 °
56. § 303(a), 102 Stat. at 756; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f) (1988). This provision is
known as the "spousal impoverishment" rule and was designed to ensure that the appli-
cant's spouse remains financially secure. See KRAUSKOPF, supra note 9, § 11.30, at 395
(noting that non-institutionalized spouses generally are allowed to retain resources suffi-
cient for their own welfare without affecting the Medicaid eligibility of the applicant).
For an informative review of the highly complex rules regarding this area known as
"spousal impoverishment," see id. §§ 11.30 - 11.34 (describing several special cases where
these rules are implicated and the subtle differences in those cases); see also ADVISING THE
ELDERLY CLIENT, supra note 21, §§ 29:79-29:93 (reviewing spousal impoverishment issues
comprehensively); Jeanne Finberg & Roger Schwartz, Implementation of the Medicaid Pro-
visions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 370, 373-75
(1989) (providing a concise summary of the spousal impoverishment provisions enacted in
MECCA '88).
57. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 303(a), 102
Stat. 683, 759. The spousal impoverishment rules were designed to protect the spouse of
nursing home residents from being forced into poverty to qualify the institutionalized
spouse for Medicaid. Patrick H. Donahue, Medicaid Eligibility for Nursing Home Care:
Understanding the New Eligibility Rules, J. KAN. B.A., May 1990, at 26, 26 n.2. Under
these rules, the state measures the couple's resources upon institutionalization and bifur-
cates all non-exempt resources between the spouses. Generally, the institutionalized
spouse then need only spend down his half of the resources to qualify for Medicaid. Col-
lins, supra note 21, at 119. In some cases, however, the non-institutionalized or "commu-
nity" spouse may retain more or less than one-half of the resources, depending on the
"community spouse resource allowance" (CSRA). Id. The CSRA is equal to the greater
of:
(1) the lesser of one-half the total resources of the couple, or $60,000 as adjusted annu-
ally for inflation (the 1994 maximum was $72,660); and
(b) $12,000 as adjusted annually for inflation , or more, if a greater minimum amount is
set by the state (the 1994 minimum was $14,532).
Id.
58. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106.
59. § 6411(e), 103 Stat. at 2271.
60. MECCA '88 had implemented broad and complex provisions allowing an appli-
cant to transfer, without impacting Medicaid eligibility, resources to his or her spouse suffi-
cient for the spouse's maintenance in the community. See Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 754, 759; see also supra note 56
(discussing the spousal impoverishment provisions of MECCA '88). The original transfer
rules enacted as part of OBRA '80 were applicable only to transfers made by the applicant.
See supra text accompanying notes 43-46 (describing the Boren-Long Amendments).
Thus, the MECCA '88 changes permitted the simple scheme by which an applicant "laun-
dered" transfers through a spouse. See § 6411, 103 Stat. at 2271 (closing this loophole by
adding to the law the language "or whose spouse," after the language "an institutionalized
individual ... who").
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2. Early Legislation Regarding Trusts
While divesting or transferring assets is the simplest Medicaid planning
strategy, for some individuals such a complete alienation of assets is intol-
erable.61 As a result, trusts have grown in popularity as a means of re-
taining control of assets while attempting to shelter them from Medicaid
eligibility determinations. Responding to the use of trusts as a Medicaid
planning tool, Congress enacted, as part of the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA '85),62 provisions designed
to include trust assets in Medicaid eligibility determinations. 63  Specifi-
cally, COBRA '85 provided that any non-testamentary trust or trust-like
device established by an individual or her spouse under which the individ-
ual may be the beneficiary of the trust, and where the trustee has discre-
tion regarding distribution, would be considered available to the
Medicaid applicant regardless of the actual trust provisions.'M Congress
termed this type of trust a "Medicaid Qualifying Trust" (MQT).65
Certainly, COBRA '85 made it more challenging to utilize trusts for
Medicaid planning by counting as available funds any amount of trust
income or principle over which a trustee maintained the discretion to dis-
tribute.66 Rather than limit the practice of Medicaid Estate Planning,
61. See BURWELL, supra note 12, at 19. Asset transfer may be unacceptable for sev-
eral reasons. Id. First, some individuals may not have family or friends to whom they
could transfer assets. Id. Second, they may be concerned that the transferee will squander
the assets and fail to provide for the transferor. Id. Third, they may rely on income from
the asset to cover their living expenses. Id.
62. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100
Stat. 82 (1986).
63. See § 9506, 100 Stat. at 210 (adding a provision to include trust amounts in Medi-
caid eligibility assessment). Section 9506 was superseded by section 13611 of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13611(d), 107 Stat. 312, 626 (rele-
vant provisions codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p) (redefining which trusts are included in de-
termining eligibility).
64. § 9506(a), 100 Stat. at 210.
65. Id. The term "Medicaid Qualifying Trust" is a misnomer because the establish-
ment of such a trust would automatically disqualify, rather than qualify, an individual for
Medicaid. Id.; see also Link v. Town of Smithtown, 616 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 n.5 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.) (describing this term as "a clear case of governmental doublespeak") amended, ad-
hered to, resettled, on reh'g, 620 N.Y.S.2d 729 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
66. § 9506(a), 100 Stat. at 210. Under the previous rule, the income and corpus from a
discretionary trust created for one's own benefit was treated as "available" in some states,
while others treated such amounts as "unavailable" unless the trustee elected to make a
distribution. Compare, e.g., Estate of Wallace v. Director, Mo. State Div. of Family Serv.,
628 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that, for Medicaid eligibility purposes,
trust funds are "available" notwithstanding the fact that the trustee discontinued making
disbursements) with Zeoli v. Commissioner of Social Serv., 425 A.2d 553, 559 (Conn. 1979)
(holding that a spendthrift trust need not disburse funds for the government to determine
Medicaid eligibility, and, thus, effectively holding that such funds are "unavailable") (su-
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however, the legislation merely stimulated more carefully constructed
trust instruments to allow individuals to retain assets and still qualify for
Medicaid.67 One common practice was to create a "convertible" or "trig-
ger" trust.68 These instruments circumvented the MQT provisions by in-
corporating language that, upon the applicant's entry into a nursing
home, immediately terminated both the trustee's discretion to make dis-
tributions to the applicant and the applicant's ability to revoke the trust.69
Another instrument that effectively evaded the MQT rules was the "do-
nor" trust, under which an individual transfers assets to another person
who then establishes a trust for the benefit of the donor.70 Because the
applicant does not establish this type of trust herself, the trust does not
fall within the precise language of the MQT provisions.71 Finally, "sup-
plemental needs trusts," which could be used only for an individual's non-
essential support, also were effective in circumventing the law.72
perseded by statute as stated in Vierra v. State, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3050 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1991)).
67. In that COBRA '85 erected more technical rules for eligibility, its greatest legacy
may be the subsequent proliferation of a multi-faceted Medicaid planning industry helping
individuals shelter assets. See supra note 18 (noting the widespread coverage of Medicaid
planning issues in newspapers and magazines, and citing the availability of books, home
videos, and even computer software designed to assist an individual or lawyer in divesting
resources to establish Medicaid eligibility). Certainly it is not coincidental that the Na-
tional Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, which was formed in 1987, now has over 2,100
members. Hearings, supra note 16, at 335 (1993) (statement of Brian 0. Burwell, Division
Manager, SysteMetrics/MEDSTAT Systems). Moreover, because congressional Medicaid
policy changes failed to control the development of Medicaid planning, some states began
enacting further restrictions of their own to limit planning opportunities. See BURWELL,
supra note 39, at 17-19.
68. See BURWELL, supra note 39, at 17 (discussing "trigger" trusts and New York legis-
lation enacted to limit the use of such trusts by deeming them void as against public
policy).
69. Id.
70. See id. at 18-19 (discussing donor trusts and Connecticut statutes designed to treat
donor trusts "as if they had been established by the Medicaid applicant himself").
71. See § 9506(a), 100 Stat. at 210 (noting that the rules applied only to trusts estab-
lished by an applicant or her spouse).
72. BURWELL, supra note 39, at 18 (citing Clifton Kruse, Discretionary Trusts: Insulat-
ing Discretionary Trust Assets for Elders and Incapacitated Persons from Consideration by
Medicaid and Other Public Support Providers (Presented at the 3rd Annual Symposium on
Elder Law, National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, Orlando, FL, May 1991)); see also
James D. Palmer, Estate Planning for Public Welfare Recipients, in 2 PROBATE AND PROP-
ERTY 43-46 (March/Apr. 1988) (discussing supplemental needs trusts).
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II. THE OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA '93),73
Congress reacted to the sophisticated instruments used to circumvent the
MQT rules by revising many of the financial Medicaid eligibility require-
ments for the medically needy category.74 In this most recent effort to
combat Medicaid Planning, Congress amended many of the rules regard-
ing resources and availability as applied to both the establishment of
trusts (or similar legal devices)75 and the outright transfer of assets.76
This legislation: expanded the definition of assets;77 extended the look-
back period for asset transfers;78 exempted certain asset transfers; 79 com-
prehensively restructured the treatment of trusts;8° increased the poten-
tial penalty for attempted asset sheltering;8' and expanded the
government's right of recovery from a recipient's estate.8" To this extent,
OBRA '93 constitutes the most significant step to date toward eliminat-
ing opportunities for the middle class to avail themselves of Medicaid
73. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(relevant provisions codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p).
74. See §§ 13661-13612, 107 Stat. at 622-29 (revamping the eligibility rules regarding
spend-down). For a terse review of the changes in Medicaid eligibility rules enacted in
OBRA '93, without extraneous policy analysis, see Sanford J. Schlesinger & Barbara J.
Scheiner, OBRA '93 Makes Sweeping Changes in Medicaid Rules, 21 EST. PLAN. 74 (1994).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
76. See § 1396p(c).
77. § 1396p(c)(3) (including in assets property held in joint tenancy or similarly); see
also discussion infra part II.A.1 (noting the replacement of the terms "income" and "re-
sources" with the term "assets").
78. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i) (extending period to 36 months); see also discussion infra part
II.A.2 (discussing extension of the look-back period).
79. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iv) (excluding transfers for benefit of spouse or children); see
also discussion infra part II.A.2.a (detailing the exemptions provided in OBRA '93 for
certain asset transfers).
80. § 1396p(d); see also discussion infra part II.A.3 (describing congressional repeal of
the MQT provisions enacted in COBRA '85, and their replacement with language exempt-
ing certain trusts and prohibiting the use of certain other trusts previously used to circum-
vent the law).
81. § 1396p(c)(1)(A),(D),(E); see also discussion infra part II.B (describing how
OBRA '93 both "uncaps" the penalty period of ineligibility for fraudulent transfers and
ensures consistent state application of the penalty periods).
82. § 1396p(b); see discussion infra part II.C (noting that OBRA '93 mandates that all
states implement programs to recover Medicaid expenditures from the estates of
recipients).
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through a process of planned impoverishment. 83 Nonetheless, opportuni-
ties for Medicaid planning still remain.
84
A. The Means Test. Determining Whether an Applicant
Is Medically Needy
1. Measuring Assets
Prior to OBRA '93, a state's first step in determining Medicaid eligibil-
ity for the medically needy involved measuring the applicant's income
and resources separately.8 5 The law previously distinguished between in-
come and resources, with only resources subjected to transfer rules.
86
This structure often disregarded financial interests that could not be pig-
eon-holed as either income or resources.87 In OBRA '93, however, Con-
gress significantly altered the way in which income and resources are
defined.
The current law replaces these two terms with the sole term "assets,"
which includes all income and resources of the individual or her spouse.88
In addition to this technical change, Congress clearly broadened the anal-
ysis of financial factors by providing that the term assets encompasses all
income or resources to which the individual or the spouse is entitled but
does not receive because of an action by: (1) the individual or spouse;
89
(2) a person, court, or administrative body with legal authority to act on
behalf of the individual or spouse;90 or (3) any person, court, or adminis-
trative body acting at the direction or request of the individual or
83. See Jane Bryant Quinn, Paring Loopholes that Let the Well-Off into Medicaid,
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1993, at H3 (quoting elder law attorney Armond Budish as saying that
10 loopholes in the eligibility rules were closed by OBRA '93); see also Schlesinger &
Scheiner, supra note 74, at 74 (noting that "[tihe new provisions will have a dramatic
impact").
84. But see discussion infra part III.A (noting several of the most significant ways in
which OBRA '93 is deficient).
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (1988) (applying eligibility requirements to the transfer
of "resources"), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (Supp. V 1993).
86. § 1396p(c) (1988), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (Supp. V 1993); see ADVISING
THE ELDERLY CLIENT, supra note 21, at 114 (stating that "the transfer penalty applie[d]
only to transfers of 'resources' ").
87. For example, a wedding ring, although it might be of great value, was not "in-
come" or a "resource" under the old law. ADVISING THE ELDERLY CLIENT, supra note 21,
at 114. Thus, retention or transfer of such property would not affect an applicant's Medi-
caid eligibility. Id.
88. § 1396p(e)(1) (Supp. V 1993). In addition to including both income and resources,
the term assets also includes "non-resources" such as the wedding ring discussed supra
note 87. See ADVISING THE ELDERLY CLIENT, supra note 21, at 114 (describing such assets
as "nonresources").




spouse.9 This broad definition of assets makes it substantially more diffi-
cult for individuals to qualify for Medicaid by divesting themselves of
their income through outright inter-vivos transfers and through the estab-
lishment of trusts or similar arrangements.
2. Transfer of Assets for Less than Fair Market Value
At first glance, it appears that the easiest way for an individual to meet
the Medicaid asset requirements and qualify as medically needy would be
to divest herself of assets through outright transfers to others.92 The
mere transfer of assets to another, however, may not produce Medicaid
eligibility. To the contrary, such a transfer could result in a period of
Medicaid ineligibility.93 Under federal law, disposal of any asset for less
than fair market value constitutes an uncompensated transfer to the ex-
tent that the value of the asset exceeds the amount realized.94 OBRA '93
expanded this rule in two very significant ways.95 First, the new law ex-
panded the asset transfer rules to include the disposal of assets held
jointly by the applicant and another.96 Second, OBRA '93 extended the
91. § 1396p(e)(1)(C).
92. This practice of divestment alternatively is known as "asset spend-down" or
"Medicaid Estate Planning." See supra note 16 (commenting on the pervasiveness of
planned divestiture and detailing an egregious example of fraudulent planning); see also
supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that "spend-down" is used also to describe
the legitimate practice of spending so much of one's assets on medical care that one quali-
fies for Medicaid under the medically needy category).
93. See discussion supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting the origin of adminis-
tering a period of Medicaid ineligibility for such uncompensated transfers of assets); see
also infra part II.B (describing in detail the recent modifications to the method of calculat-
ing the ineligibility period).
94. § 1396p(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
95. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (detailing the significance of these
changes).
96. § 1396p(c)(3) (Supp. V 1993). Prior to OBRA '93 the treatment of jointly held
assets depended upon each state's respective laws regarding the property rights of owners
of jointly held assets. See BURWELL, supra note 12, at 16 (noting the differences in state
treatment of jointly held assets). In some states, all persons with joint title are equal own-
ers. Id. Therefore, it was assumed that the applicant owned a proportionate share of the
property, and any act by a non-applicant owner with his or her share was disregarded. Id.
However, other states treated the full amount of any jointly held assets as belonging to the
applicant for Medicaid purposes. Id. Such a rule was established in Florida, where the
state supreme court created the "Streimer rule", holding that the actions of one co-owner
could not be considered in determining the Medicaid eligibility of another. Id. at 17. Sev-
eral other states, however, responded to the situation by enacting their own regulations
extending transfer rules to these types of transfers. See BURWELL, supra note 39, at 11
(noting that, in Wisconsin, the Health Care Cost Containment Task Force recommended
legislation treating withdrawals from joint bank accounts as prohibited transfers); see also
id. at 10-11 (describing similar efforts in Michigan, Arizona, and Virginia). In OBRA '93,
Congress incorporated this approach, and clarified that creation of any joint ownership
rights would be considered a transfer of the asset. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(3) (Supp V. 1993).
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"look-back" period for fraudulent asset transfers.97 Previously, any
transfer of assets made within the thirty months prior to application for
Medicaid would render an applicant ineligible. 8 OBRA '93, however,
extended this "look-back" period to thirty-six months. 99
The clearest effect of this change is that, where assets are held with another person in
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or other similar arrangements, any action by the appli-
cant or another that reduces or eliminates the applicant's ownership or control of the asset
is considered to be a transfer of the asset. Id. Not as obvious, but equally important,
under the new law some transactions that typically may not be thought of as asset transfers
may fall within this provision. See KRAUSKOPF, supra note 9, § 11.41, at 407-08 (discussing
this effect). For example, the mere addition of another's name to a bank account may
constitute an uncompensated transfer of assets to the extent that there is no reciprocal
transfer of property of comparable value. Id. at 407.
97. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (explaining the extent of this change).
98. The rationale for the 30-month period was that, because most individuals cannot
accurately anticipate when they will need long-term care and usually do not initiate Medi-
caid planning until placement in a nursing home is imminent, such a period would be am-
ple to trace most transfers and would not be administratively burdensome or cost-
prohibitive. See BURWELL, supra note 12, at 15; see also LEON TROTSKY, DIARY IN EXILE
106 (Elena Zarudnaya trans., 1958) (observing that "[olld age is the most unexpected of all
the things that happen to a man"). Indeed, although a recent Gallup Organization poll
indicated that 76% of the population did not expect to need long-term care, in fact 43% of
the individuals who celebrated a 65th birthday in 1990 will need long-term nursing home
care during their lifetime. Long Term Care Insurance: Debunking The Myths, BACK-
GROUND (American Health Care Association, Washington, DC) at 1 (on file with The
Catholic University Law Review) (citing Public Attitudes on Long Term Care: "The EBRI
Poll", THE GALLUP ORG., INC. at 15 (1993)). Hence, long-term care will be needed by
nearly twice as many people as expect to need such care.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B) (Supp. V. 1993). The practical utility of extending the
look-back period was a point of disagreement at the Committee hearing regarding these
provisions. See generally Hearings, supra note 16, at 423 (including several different opin-
ions on extending the look-back period). A representative of the American Health Care
Association urged Congress to extend the period to 60 months. Id. at 389 (statement of
Steven Chies, representative of the American Health Care Association). The President of
the American Association of Homes for the Aging even suggested extending the period to
5 years. Id. at 370 (statement of Sheldon L. Goldberg, President, American Association of
Homes for the Aging). But, a representative of the National Senior Citizens Law Center
strongly opposed any extension, arguing that extending the look-back period would be
administratively infeasible and would place a tremendous burden on applicants in terms of
record-keeping and recollection. Id. at 406 (statement of Patricia Nemore, Staff Attorney,
NSCLC). In addition, it was suggested that extending the look-back period would not
discourage planning but "will likely result in an increase in desperate actions by people
who have always played by the rules .... [and] will yield only the bleak result of further
impoverishing our elders for committing the crime of leading long and productive lives."
Id. at 357 (statement of Vincent Russo, President, National Academy of Elder Law Attor-
neys). Moreover, Mr. Russo noted that requiring seniors, a significant number of whom
are debilitated by Parkinsons, Alzheimers, or Senile Dementia, to provide detailed records
for financial transactions occurring 3, 4, or 5 years ago "is unrealistic and unreasonable, a
trap guaranteeing Medicaid denial .... for those in need." Id. at 358.
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a. Exceptions to the Transfer Rules
Despite the expanded definition of available assets and the extended
look-back period, the current law still provides that certain transfers will
not affect Medicaid eligibility.' For example, transfers not made for the
purpose of qualifying for Medicaid will not result in ineligibility. 101 Spe-
cifically, an individual must affirmatively prove that she either intended
to dispose of the resources for fair market value or other valuable consid-
eration,0 2 or that she transferred the assets for a purpose other than to
qualify for Medicaid.'0 3 In addition, the current law allows an individual
to correct an uncompensated transfer by retrieving all of the assets
transferred.' 4
100. § 1396p(c)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see infra notes 101-15 and accompanying
text (discussing these exempt transfers).
101. § 1396p(c)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1993). Under guidelines released by the Health Care
Financing Administration, asset transfers for less than fair market value made within the
look-back period are rebuttably presumed to have been made for the purpose of establish-
ing Medicaid eligibility. HCFA Pub. No. 45-3 (State Medicaid Manual) § 3250.3.
102. § 1396p(c)(2)(C)(i). Under this exception, a transfer will not be considered in de-
termining Medicaid eligibility if the applicant shows that the individual intended to dispose
of the assets either at fair market value or for other valuable consideration. Id. This ex-
ception prevents the imposition of undue penalties on individuals entering into arms-
length transactions in which they meant to receive full value for the asset transferred.
103. § 1396p(c)(2)(C)(ii). For example, where an individual in good health makes es-
tate planning transfers solely for the beneficial tax consequences and subsequently suffers
from ill-health and applies for Medicaid, this exemption may apply. See ADVISING THE
ELDERLY CLIENT, supra note 21, at 114 (posing this hypothetical as a case where the ex-
emption may be appropriate).
104. § 1396p(c)(2)(C)(iii). Some commentators have noted that this provision is prob-
lematic because it does not address the partial return of transferred assets. See Jonathan
M. Forster, OBRA 1993 and its Impact on Medicaid Planning, in ADVISING THE ELDERLY
CLIENT, OBRA '93 ALERT 3, 3 (Louis A. Mezzullo et al. eds., 1993) (stating that "[t]his
new rule may create some harsh results when transferred assets cannot be fully retrieved");
see also Collins, supra note 21, at 128 (noting many questions that remain unanswered
about correcting transfers). It may be that Congress recognized that rules regarding partial
returns would be difficult to employ, as the commentators suggest and, therefore, chose
not to allow for partial corrections. This choice is evidenced by the affirmative statement
that "all" assets must returned. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(iii); see Harry S. Margolis, Now It's the
Law: Revised Medicaid Eligibility Rules Take Effect, THE ELDERLAW REP., Aug. 1993, at 1,
2 (noting that corrective transfers are allowed only if all transferred assets are returned to
the transferor).
Notwithstanding any efforts to resolve these questions, it seems that corrective transfers
will remain rare because upon return to the applicant the transferred asset becomes an
available asset and will disqualify the recipient from Medicaid. See discussion supra part
II.A.1 (regarding measurement of assets in determining Medicaid eligibility); see also Mar-
golis, supra, at 2 (noting that Massachusetts previously allowed corrective transfers and
then reversed its policy).
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The rules regarding transfer of assets also continue to provide specific
exceptions for the transfer of a home.1"5 The transfer of an individual's
home will not constitute an uncompensated transfer so long as the trans-
fer is made to: (1) a spouse; 10 6 (2) a child of the applicant who is blind,
disabled, or under twenty-one years of age;10 7 (3) a child who has resided
there for at least two years immediately prior to the applicant's institu-
tionalization and who provided care for the applicant;0 8 or (4) a sibling
with an equity interest who had resided therein for at least one year prior
to the applicant's institutionalization.' 0 9
The current law also continues to provide exceptions for certain asset
transfers involving an applicant's spouse. 110 Any transfers to or from the
applicant's spouse still are not considered uncompensated transfers, pro-
vided they are for the sole benefit of the spouse."' Likewise, the current
law also continues to exempt transfers to an applicant's blind or disabled
children.' 12 In addition, OBRA '93 exempts transfers to trusts estab-
lished solely for the benefit of one's blind or disabled children, 1 3 or to
trusts established solely for the benefit of disabled individuals over sixty-
105. These exceptions were enacted originally in the Medicaid Catastrophic Coverage
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 303(b), 102 Stat. 683, 760-61 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p (1988)).




110. See supra note 60 (noting the broad provisions enacted in MECCA '88, allowing




113. Id. Some critics have argued that in limiting this exception to only trusts estab-
lished "solely for the benefit of" these specified individuals, Congress has created confu-
sion about the requirements of such trusts. See Peter J. Strauss, Medicaid Revisions in 1993
Budget Act, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1993, at 7 (questioning whether the terms of the trust must
establish the applicant's estate as the sole remainderman upon the applicant's death); see
also Schlesinger & Scheiner, supra note 74, at 76 (noting that it is unclear whether "a trust
for the sole benefit of the spouse for life, with the remainder to someone else, [would] be a
trust for the sole benefit of the spouse").
In light of the broad estate recovery provisions also included in OBRA '93, it seems that
Congress would have intended this provision to apply only to trusts where any assets re-
maining at the beneficiary's death were to be paid to the estate. See discussion infra part
II.C (detailing the broad estate recovery provisions enacted in OBRA '93). However, the
record is silent. See generally Hearings, supra note 16; H.R. REP. No. 103-111, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 512-515,533-36; H.R. CONF. REP. No.
103-213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 399 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1523-24 (all
failing to refer to this issue in any way).
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five years of age.114 Finally, Congress has provided that states may ex-
empt uncompensated transfers if the denial of Medicaid benefits would
cause an "undue hardship" upon an individual.1 15
3. Treatment of Trusts Under the Rules
a. General Changes
As with outright transfers, Congress has made it increasingly difficult
to utilize trust instruments to qualify for Medicaid. COBRA '85 marked
the first significant effort to regulate trusts. 116 Under COBRA '85, the
maximum amount distributable to the applicant was considered an avail-
able asset regardless of whether the trustee ever exercised the discretion-
ary power to make such a distribution. 1 7 OBRA '93 repealed these
provisions regarding Medicaid qualifying trusts and instead utilizes a
broader set of rules to more effectively curtail the use of trusts or similar
mechanisms to qualify for Medicaid." 8
Under the current law, Medicaid trust rules apply to any inter vivos
trust established by either (1) the applicant;11 9 (2) the applicant's
spouse; 20 (3) any person, including a court or administrative body, with
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(iv) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also supra note 113
(discussing criticism that Congress has created confusion by using the language "solely for
the benefit of").
115. § 1396p(c)(2)(D). Standards for determining when the denial of Medicaid would
result in an undue hardship are to be promulgated by the Secretary of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Id. Although Medicaid law previ-
ously allowed for a waiver in the cases of undue hardship, the waiver was seldom used.
Roger A. McEowen, Estate Planning for Farm and Ranch Families Facing Long-Term
Health Care, 73 NEB. L. REV. 104, 117 (1994). By requiring the Secretary of HHS to estab-
lish criteria for granting undue hardship waivers, it appears that Congress wants waivers to
be granted more liberally. Id.
116. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act deemed all "Medicaid
Qualifying Trusts" available resources and provided, in relevant part:
[A] "medicaid qualifying trust" is a trust, or similar legal device, established
(other than by will) by an individual (or an individual's spouse) under which the
individual may be the beneficiary of all or part of the payments from the trust and
the distribution of such payments is determined by one or more trustees who are
permitted to exercise any discretion with respect to the distribution to the
individual.
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 6202, 100
Stat. 82, 210 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1396a(k) (1988)) (repealed by §§ 13611-13612 of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1396p)). For a summary of the emergence and ultimate demise of the concept
of Medicaid Qualifying Trusts, see discussion supra part I.C.2.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(1) (1988) (repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312).
118. Compare id. with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
119. § 1396p(d)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
120. § 1396p(d)(2)(A)(ii).
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the legal authority to act on behalf of the applicant or spouse; 12 1 or (4) a
person, including a court or administrative body, acting at the direction or
request of the applicant or spouse.122 Moreover, in contrast to the previ-
ous rules, this provision applies irrespective of the purpose behind the
trust,'2 3 the trustee's discretion over principal and income, 24 any restric-
tions over trust distributions,'125 and any restrictions on the use of such
distributions. 126 Of course, these rules do not invalidate the stated pur-
pose of the trust, any limits placed on trustee discretion, or any distribu-
tion restrictions incorporated into the trust instrument. Rather, they
merely provide that regardless of any such provisions, a trust formed
from an applicant's assets will be counted as an available asset for the
purpose of determining Medicaid eligibility. 27
b. Revocable Trusts Under the Current Law
Unlike COBRA '85, the current law distinguishes between revocable
and irrevocable trusts. 28 The first notable rule with respect to revocable
trusts provides that the corpus of a revocable trust will be considered an
available resource.' 29 In addition, the current law states that any "pay-
ments from the trust to or for the benefit of the individual shall be consid-
ered income of the individual."' 3 ° As income, these payments apparently
would not be subject to the thirty-six-month look-back period for out-
right transfers of assets, but instead would be added to items such as SSI
121. § 1396p(d)(2)(A)(iii). This provision addresses the broad use of supplemental
needs trusts to establish Medicaid eligibility under the former law. See supra text accom-
panying note 72 (describing this use of "SNT's"). However, OBRA '93 did not prohibit
the use of SNT's for all purposes. See infra notes 153-58 (describing how OBRA '93 im-
plicitly sanctions the use of SNT's for certain purposes).
122. § 1396p(d)(2)(A)(iv). This provision specifically addresses the use of donor trusts
under the former law. See supra text accompanying note 70 (describing the use of donor
trusts).
123. § 1396p(d)(2)(C)(i).
124. § 1396p(d)(2)(C)(ii). This provision is designed specifically to limit the use of
"trigger" or "convertible" trusts to qualify for Medicaid. See supra notes 68-69 and accom-




127. JOHN J. REGAN, TAX, ESTATE & FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR THE ELDERLY
§ 10.13[1], at 10-83 (1994).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3)(A) & (B) (Supp. V 1993) (setting out separate rules
for revocable and irrevocable trusts).
129. § 1396p(d)(3)(A)(i). This is an equitable way to regard assets in a revocable trust
considering that, by definition, the assets are available to the grantor by simply revoking
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and private pension payments in determining an individual's eligibility for
Medicaid. 31
The most significant change in the treatment of revocable trusts relates
to distributions made other than "to or for the benefit of the individ-
ual." '132 These payments are similar in effect to outright uncompensated
transfers of assets, in that they are made to a third-party presumably to
qualify the applicant for Medicaid. 13 3 Whereas the look-back period for
outright transfers is thirty-six months, the look-back period for similar
transfers from a trust is set at sixty months.
1 34
Nonetheless, an applicant easily can circumvent the sixty month look-
back period. 35 Instead of providing for a payment from the trust directly
to a third party, the applicant simply must provide for the distribution of
trust amounts to herself first and then transfer that amount to the third
party. 136 This distribution is treated as an outright asset transfer, thereby
triggering the thirty-six month look-back period. 137 Hence, the transfer
would not affect Medicaid eligibility if the individual were to apply more
than thirty-six months later.
138
131. 45 C.F.R. §§ 435.800 to 435.845 (1994). In light of the fact that these transfers of
trust funds are made to the applicant and, therefore, could not have been made in order to
qualify for Medicaid, it would be improper to treat them like other asset transfers. See
supra text accompanying notes 92-99 (noting that the law focuses on "disposal" of assets).
Rather, it is more appropriate to characterize these payments as income because they are
liquid assets received by the applicant with which he or she can pay for goods or services.
42 C.F.R. §§ 435.800 to 435.845 (1994).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1993).
133. Both types of transfers essentially are uncompensated transfers of assets belonging
to the applicant made to third parties. § 1396p(d)(3)(A).
134. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i).
135. Cf Forster, supra note 104, at 4 (noting that individuals who established revocable




138. Depending on the size of the payment and the average cost of nursing home care
in the state, little or no benefit would be derived from this arrangement if the individual
actually applied for Medicaid within the 36-month period immediately following the trans-
fer because of the penalty provisions of the law. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99
(noting the extension of the look-back period from 30 to 36 months). Rather, the arrange-
ment will work only if the applicant waits and does not apply until the look-back period no
longer includes this transfer. Supra notes 98-99. Nonetheless, this situation illustrates the
severe limitation of the policing approach incorporated in current rules. Even under the
improved rules, no matter how wealthy an individual may be, she may be able to qualify
for total Medicaid financing of long-term care needs by merely waiting to apply for Medi-
caid until 36 months after the asset transfer. See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text
(providing an example of this "bottom-line" effect of OBRA '93).
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c. Irrevocable Trusts Under the Current Law
In the case of irrevocable trusts, as with revocable trusts, the new rules
provide that any portion of the corpus or income that could be distrib-
uted to or for the benefit of the individual is considered an available as-
set. 139 Again, the test is not whether any distributions actually were
made, but whether it is at all possible for distributions to be made. 40
Furthermore, the current law treats as income any previous payments
from an irrevocable trust to or for the benefit of the applicant. 4 '
With respect to payments for any other purpose from the corpus or
income of an irrevocable trust, the rule also is similar to that for revoca-
ble trusts. 142 These payments are treated as transfers of assets.143 Ac-
cording to the strict language of the statute, the look-back period for
these transfers is only thirty-six months, 1'" whereas similar transfers from
revocable trusts are subject to a sixty-month look-back period. 45
Finally, under the OBRA '93 amendments, all amounts paid into or
earned by an irrevocable trust specifically barring distribution to the ap-
plicant are treated as transferred assets. 146 In addition, Congress has pro-
vided that the amount transferred shall be calculated irrespective of any
amounts disbursed from the trust since its creation.' 47 Moreover, unlike
any other similar type of outright transfers by the applicant, these trans-
fers are subject to a sixty-month look-back period. 48
This inconsistent treatment of asset transfers from revocable and irrev-
ocable trusts appears to be the product of minor drafting errors.' 49 In
fact, it appears that Congress intended to apply the same rules-a sixty
month look-back period to distributions from a trust and a thirty-six
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3)(B)(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 129-30 (illustrating that the same rules apply for revocable trusts).
140. § 1396p(d)(3)(B)(i).
141. § 1396p(d)(3)(B)(i)(I). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma recently ruled that this
provision even requires that funds transferred to the applicant from a trust, which itself
would be exempt from consideration in determining Medicaid eligibility, be treated as in-
come. Trust Co. v. State ex reL Dep't of Human Serv., 890 P.2d 1342 (Okla. 1995).
142. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1993) (governing revocable







149. See Strauss, supra note 113, at 31 (stating that this inconsistent treatment must be
the result of drafting errors); see also Forster, supra note 104, at 4 (stating that only a few
points are clear from the rules).
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month look-back period to amounts earned by or transferred to a trust-
regardless of whether the trust is revocable or irrevocable. 5 °
d. Exempt Trusts
Although the current law generally is designed to combat the use of
Medicaid trusts, the rules specifically exempt certain trusts from consider-
ation in determining Medicaid eligibility. 5 ' These trusts will not be con-
sidered even when they distribute or receive assets that would otherwise
be considered available." 2
The first exemption applies to trusts established "by a parent, grand-
parent, legal guardian of the individual, or a court" for the benefit of
disabled persons under sixty-five years of age.153 This exemption implic-
itly sanctions the pre-existing practice of establishing a supplemental
needs trust with assets received through judgments or settlements for the
benefit of a disabled individual.' 54 Such trusts are designed to supple-
150. See discussion supra part III.A.1 (illustrating that if these errors are corrected the
statute is much more sensible and consistent in its treatment of irrevocable and revocable
trusts).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) (Supp. V 1993).
152. Id. The availability principle is discussed supra note 36.
153. § 1396p(d)(4)(A); see In re Moretti, 606 N.Y.S.2d 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (ex-
empting a judgment-financed supplemental needs trust established for an incapacitated
fifteen year-old by the court with his parents as conservators) (superseded by statute as
stated in Link v. Smithtown, 616 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994)). In Moretti, the court
found that under § 1396p(d)(4)(A) "both the corpus and the income of the trust may be
used during the beneficiary's lifetime with full trustee discretion for the benefit of the dis-
abled individual." Id. at 546. Accordingly, the exemption applied. Id. at 546.
In Frerks v. Shalala, however, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York recently upheld a determination by HHS that a similar court-created trust was
not an exempt asset where the discretion to distribute funds was held by the court. 848 F.
Supp. 340, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). In Frerks, the District Court found that although funds
could not be withdrawn from the trust without a court order, the court's history in granting
requests for other disbursements from this trust made reasonable the determination by
HHS that the funds were available. Id. at 348-49.
154. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993). Supplemental needs trusts previously were con-
sidered exempt in a number of states. See, e.g., In Re Escher, 438 N.Y.S.2d 293 (N.Y.
1981). However, in some states, such as New York, supplemental needs trusts were exempt
only if they were created by a third party with no legal obligation to support the benefici-
ary. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 7-1.12(a)(5)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 1995), N.Y.
MENT. HYG. § 43.03(d) (McKinney Supp. 1995), and N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 104(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1995); State v. Coyle, 575 N.Y.S.2d 975, 976 (N.Y. App. Div.) (refusing to exempt
self-settled trusts), appeal denied, 580 N.Y.S.2d 188 (N.Y. 1991); In re Garbow, 591 N.Y.S.
2d 754 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1992) (ruling that a supplemental needs trust established by the appli-
cant's parents was "unavailable" because the applicant's parents had no obligation to sup-
port him). Thus, in some states the effect of OBRA '93 might be to expand this exemption
slightly by requiring states to exempt even self-settled supplemental needs trusts so long as
the settlor is over 65 years of age and the trust remainder passes to the state upon the
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ment, not supplant, Medicaid.155 While OBRA '93 does not use the term
supplemental needs trust, it endorses the use of such instruments for the
benefit of disabled individuals under the age of sixty-five. 56 While the
assets for these trusts often are derived from litigation, this exemption is
not restricted to assets acquired in that manner.1 57 The exemption is lim-
ited, however, only to trusts specifically providing that, upon the death of
the applicant, the remainder of the trust will be used to reimburse the
state for Medicaid expenditures made on her behalf.'58
The second type of exempt trusts are those that meet certain criteria
and are established for disabled individuals, regardless of their age. 15 9 To
qualify, these trusts must be held and managed by a non-profit organiza-
tion.160 The organization must maintain a separate trust account for each
individual, but may pool the assets for investment and management pur-
poses.' 61 In contrast to exempted trusts for disabled persons under sixty-
five years of age, these trusts may be established not only by a parent,
grandparent, legal guardian, or a court, but also by the applicant her-
self.' 62 Finally, the trust must provide that, upon the death of the individ-
ual, the funds either will remain in the pooled trust (apparently for the
benefit of other participants) or will be used to reimburse the state to the
extent of the Medicaid benefits provided.1
6 3
The third type of exempt trusts are those with income payable to the
individual." This exemption codifies the case of Miller v. Ibarra,165
beneficiary's death. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C) (Supp. V 1993); see also infra notes
162-65 and accompanying text (noting this conditional exemption).
155. See, e.g., Missouri Div. of Family Serv. v. Wilson, 849 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993) (involving such a trust).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (Supp. V. 1993).
157. Id. For an example of a case in which the corpus of a valid supplemental needs
trust was not financed with the proceeds of a judgment, see Hecker v. Stark County Social
Services Board, 527 N.W.2d 226 (N.D. 1994). Hecker involved a testamentary trust estab-
lished by the beneficiary's mother. Id. at 228.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
159. § 1396p(d)(4)(C).
160. § 1396p(d)(4)(C)(i). Many non-profit organizations maintain "master trusts" for




164. See § 1396p(d)(4)(B). It was not clear from OBRA '93 that these "income-only"
trusts were exempt. See Harry S. Margolis, Income-Only Trusts Resuscitated Under HCFA
Interpretation of OBRA-93, THE ELDERLAw REP., Feb. 1994, at 1 (discussing inquiries to
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) about the continued use of such
trusts). However, HCFA now permits these "income-only" trusts subject to the following
provisions: trust income or corpus paid to the applicant is considered income of the appli-
cant; corpus is considered available to the extent it may be distributed to the applicant; the
transfer penalties and look-back period apply for any amounts which could be paid to the
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which allowed individuals in "income cap" states166 to qualify for Medi-
caid despite the fact that their income exceeded the cap.' 67 To qualify
under this exemption, a trust must be composed solely of pension, SSI,
and other income of the individual, 68 and must entitle the state, upon the
beneficiary's death, to the remainder of the trust to the extent of its
Medicaid expenditures on her behalf.'
69
Finally, an exemption from the trust rules is available to those who can
establish that the application of the rules would result in an "undue
hardship."'70
B. Uncapping the Ineligibility Period for Fraudulent Transfers
The period of ineligibility refers to the period for which an individual is
ineligible for Medicaid benefits because of an improper transfer of assets
applicant but are instead paid to another individual; and to the extent that corpus cannot
be distributed to the applicant it is considered unavailable. See id. at 1-3 (citing letter from
Sally K. Richardson, Director, Medicaid Bureau of HCFA, authorizing the use of such
trusts).
165. 746 F. Supp. 19 (D. Colo. 1990).
166. States that provide Medicaid for individuals with income up to 300% of the SSI
federal benefit level in place of offering a "medically needy" option are termed "income
cap" states. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(f)(4)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 42 C.F.R. § 435.1005
(1994). The major difference in this program is that individuals may qualify for Medicaid
by proving that they have "spent-down" their assets on medical costs. Cf. supra note 28
and accompanying text (detailing the spend-down provision in the traditional medically
needy classification).
167. See Miller, 746 F. Supp. at 34. In Miller, Medicaid eligibility was established for
four mentally incompetent nursing home patients by creating trusts permitting the trustees
to distribute only an amount of income under the eligibility cap. Id. at 21-23. In each
case, the trustee's discretion was limited by a clause similar to that in the trust established
for plaintiff Lottie Bernice Ham, which provided that
"[i]n no event shall such amounts paid or applied each month for Beneficiary's
basic living needs, from her income, the corpus of this trust, or any other source
combined therewith, exceed the sum computed by subtracting twenty dollars
($20.00) from the monthly income eligibility standard currently in use by the
Medicaid program .... "
Id. at 21; see also id. at 21-22 (noting that each of the four plaintiffs had a trust established
on her behalf with language identical to the other trusts). Accordingly, the amount of
income "actually available" to the applicant was below the income cap. See supra notes
36-37 and accompanying text (discussing the "availability principle"). Contra Barham v.
Rubin, 816 P.2d 965, 966-67 (Haw. 1991) (ruling that a judgment-financed, court-approved
trust was an "available resource" which the applicant was required to spend-down to be-
come eligible for Medicaid).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
169. § 1396p(d)(4)(B)(ii).
170. § 1396p(d)(5). This provision requires the state agency to promulgate procedures
in accordance with standards set by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services for determining whether the application of the rules would work an undue hard-
ship upon the applicant. Id. For a better understanding of the impact of this undue hard-
ship provision, see supra note 115.
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or use of a trust to shelter assets.171 Prior to OBRA '93, the period of
ineligibility could not extend beyond thirty months from the date of the
transfer.172 The period was calculated as the lesser of thirty months or
the number of months equal to the amount of the transfer divided by the
average monthly cost of a private nursing home in the applicant's state of
residence. 173 In states that allowed for concurrent counting of transfers,
however, the efficacy of the rule could be undermined.
174
More specifically, if an individual disposed of $40,000 and the average
monthly cost of care was $4,000, a ten-month period of ineligibility would
be created.175 If the individual then disposed of an additional $36,000 in
the following month, the law imposed an additional nine-month period of
ineligibility at the end of the original penalty. 176 Hence, in most states
the individual would be ineligible for Medicaid for nineteen months.
177
In states allowing concurrent counting of transfers, however, the above
transactions would have resulted in only ten months of ineligibility, be-
cause the nine-month penalty could be served concurrently with the ten-
month penalty.1
78
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
172. § 1396p(c)(1) (1988).
173. Id. The federal government, through periodic transmittals from HCFA, provides
states with the appropriate figures for this average monthly cost.
174. MECCA '88, which provided that "[tihe period of ineligibility shall begin with the
month in which such resources were transferred," id., did not clearly establish whether
penalty periods of ineligibility were to be imposed consecutively or concurrently. Medi-
care Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, § 303, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683, 761. As
a result, states took different approaches. See Medicaid Survey Results: Still No Nationwide
Standards, THE ELDERLAW REP. (Mar. 1992) (surveying the approaches implemented by
the various states and concluding that the use of different rules among the states creates
substantially different outcomes among applicants). HCFA, the agency charged with
promulgating regulations under the Medicaid laws, recognized that the concurrent method
tended to eliminate the connection between the size of the transfer and the penalty, but
ruled, nonetheless, that the concurrent method was reasonable and valid absent regula-
tions to the contrary. See Medicaid State Operations Letter 90-87, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES NEWS RELEASE, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE, NEW
DEVELOPMENTS (providing the official opinion by HCFA permitting states to utilize con-
current counting).
175. The amount disposed ($40,000) divided by the average monthly cost ($4,000)
equals 10.
176. The amount disposed ($36,000) divided by the average monthly cost ($4,000)
equals 9.
177. The nine-month penalty would be added to the 10-month penalty.
178. In light of the 30-month ineligibility cap, the most significant discrepancy would
occur in the case of two individuals disposing assets equal to 28 times the average cost of
care. In a traditional state, the period of ineligibility would be 28 months, regardless of
how the disposal was structured. In a concurrent counting state, however, an individual
disposing the assets through a decreasing stream of monthly payments from seven times
the monthly average down to one, would only serve a seven-month period of ineligibility.
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As under the previous law, the penalty period is determined by divid-
ing the uncompensated amount transferred by the average monthly cost
of private nursing home care.179 OBRA '93, however, does not limit the
period of ineligibility.18 ° Thus, persons disposing of large amounts of as-
sets can now be ineligible for Medicaid for more than three years.
181
In addition to the changes regarding the penalty period cap, OBRA '93
addressed the inequities between states that utilized concurrent penalty
periods and those that stacked the penalty periods. 8 z The revised law
requires states to aggregate all transfers made within the look-back pe-
riod for the purpose of calculating the penalty period.'
83
Finally, the prior rules had imposed the period of ineligibility only if
the applicant sought services in a nursing home. 84 The current law al-
lows states to apply the transfer rules to other long-term care services
covered by Medicaid. 85 Thus, as a result of improper asset transfers, an
individual can be rendered ineligible not only for nursing home coverage,
but also for services such as home health care, respite care, personal care
services, and other long-term care services provided by the state. 86
C. Mandatory Estate Recovery
Prior to OBRA '93, Congress granted states the option of recovering
Medicaid payments from a recipient's probate estate.'8 7 This option in-
cluded the power to place a lien on the recipient's home, foreclosable
179. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(E) (Supp. V 1993). The new rules do provide one change
with respect to this calculation-a state now may use either the average cost of private
nursing home care for the entire state or the average cost for care in the community where
the individual is institutionalized. § 1396p(c)(1)(E)(i)(I).
180. See § 1396p(c) (lacking a penalty period limit). Prior to the passage of this provi-
sion for unlimited penalties, Connecticut applied for a waiver allowing it to extend both
the penalty cap and the look-back period to 60 months. Kenneth M. Coughlin, Here Come
the Trustbusters: States Move to Restrict Medicaid Planning, THE ELDERLAw REP., Nov.
1992, at 1. At the same time, Ohio was considering applying for a similar waiver. Id.
181. The average cost for nursing home care is approximately $40,000 annually, or
about $3333 per month. See supra note 13 (noting this average cost of care). Thus, to be
ineligible for longer than 36 months an individual typically would have to dispose of more
than $120,000 in assets.
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(E) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring states to implement a
cumulative method for determining penalty periods).
183. § 1396p(c)(1)(E)(i)(I)-(II).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1) (1988), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (Supp. V 1993).
This provision also extended to institutions essentially equivalent to nursing facilities. Id.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 1993). Specifically, states may apply the
transfer rules to "other long-term care services for which medical assistance is otherwise
available under the State plan .... Id.
186. See id.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1988), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (Supp. V 1993).
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under certain conditions,188 after it was clear that the recipient would not
return home. 89 Nonetheless, only one-half of all states maintained such
estate recovery programs' 90 and, among those that did, very few were
effective. 19'
Responding to the ineffectiveness of existing estate recovery programs,
OBRA '93 substantially expanded the concept of recovery.' 92 The new
law now requires states to recover the costs of Medicaid payments for
nursing home or other long-term care from the estate of any individual
receiving benefits after age fifty-five.193 The state may recover these
amounts either from the individual's estate, or upon the sale of any prop-
erty subjected to a lien imposed by the state.194 The law retains the previ-
188. No lien could be imposed while the recipient's spouse, minor or disabled child, or
sibling with an equity interest in the property, is residing in the home. Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, § 132(b), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 370-71 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (1988)).
189. See id. at 370 (disallowing a lien unless "the State determines, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing (in accordance with procedures established by the State), that
[an applicant] cannot reasonably be expected to ... return home").
190. A survey by the American Public Welfare Association indicated that during the
year prior to OBRA '93, 25 states and the District of Columbia maintained estate recovery
programs, while 23 states did not (two states failed to respond). AMERICAN PUBLIC WEL-
FARE ASSOCIATION, ESTATE RECOVERY SURVEY RESULTS (1992).
191. In 1988, the Office of Inspector General studied state Medicaid estate recovery
programs and found very few to be effective. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, MEDI-
CAID ESTATE RECOVERIES, HHS/OAI-09-86-00078 (June 1988). A subsequent study by
the General Accounting Office in 1989 found that although many states recently had im-
plemented changes to improve their estate recovery programs, most programs remained
ineffective in recovering benefits from the estates of Medicaid recipients. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: RECOVERIES FROM NURSING HOME RESIDENTS' ESTATES
COULD OFFSET PROGRAM COSTS, GAO/HRD-89-56 (Mar. 1989).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (Supp. V 1993); see supra note 191 (describing the inef-
fectiveness of pre-existing estate recovery programs).
193. § 1396p(b)(1)(B). The age 55 requirement may be another drafting error because
the context of the section suggests, and the prior law provided, that this recovery would
extend to benefits received after the age of 65. See Renee R. Neeld, Medicaid Planning:
1993 OBRA Asset Transfer Restrictions and Estate Recovery, 37 RES GESTAE 329, 330
(1994) (noting that "the text of the law says age 55, which is probably an error"). Nonethe-
less, as enacted the statute reads "55." See § 1396p(b)(1)(B) (stating, notwithstanding the
fact that recipients of long-term care Medicaid benefits who qualify based on their finan-
cial status must be over age 65, that recovery provisions apply in cases of individuals over
age 55 receiving benefits); see also Schlesinger & Scheiner, supra note 74, at 80 (stating
that "the age 55 requirement may be a drafting error because the context of the new stat-
ute seems to imply that age 65-the requirement under the prior statute-was intended");
Strauss, supra note 113, at 31 (noting this inconsistency and suggesting a technical amend-
ment to correct the language).
194. § 1396p(b)(1)(A). Prior to OBRA '93, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had
developed an effective scheme for estate recovery which could serve as a model for other
states attempting to comply with the mandatory recovery requirement. See generally COM-
MONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, SPECIAL COMMISSION ON MEDICAID ESTATE RECOV-
ERY: REPORT AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION (Nov. 1991). This approach requires
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ous conditions that allowed recovery only after the death of the
individual's surviving spouse, and only so long as there are no surviving
children under the age of twenty-one, blind, or permanently disabled. 195
While it remained unclear prior to OBRA '93 whether the recoverable
estate was limited to the probate estate of the recipient,196 the new law
explicitly includes within the recoverable estate all real and personal
property, as well as all other assets included within the individual's estate
as defined by that state's probate law. 197 In addition, states may count
any other assets in which the individual had an interest at the time of
death, including those conveyed to others through probate and non-pro-
bate arrangements.'98 Finally, the new law provides that the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) shall establish
standards for waiving the right to recovery in cases where recovery would
work an undue hardship.199
administrators of all probated estates to file the probate petition and the decedent's death
certificate with the state Medicaid bureau. Id. The data is then checked against Medicaid
recipient lists to determine whether the estate shall be subject to recovery of Medicaid
expenditures. Id.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (1988), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (Supp. V
1993); see Citizens Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003, 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1989) (ruling
that because Congress did not define "estate" the common law definition applied and,
therefore, property formerly under joint tenancy and passing outside the probate estate
was not recoverable), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990), superseded by statute as stated in
Demille v. Belshe, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13917 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1994).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993). This provision may be cumbersome
for some planners to handle, because states are not uniform in defining estate. See M. Ann
Miller, Your Money For Your Life: A Survey And Analysis Of Medicaid Estate Recovery
Programs, 11 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 581, 598-99 (1994) (surveying some of the major dif-
ferences among the states).
Medicaid estate planners may find dealing with these provisions to be especially complex
in states with augmented estate statutes. See Forster, supra note 104, at 4. The Uniform
Probate Code provides an example of an augmented estate statute. See UNIFORM PRO-
BATE CODE § 2-202 (1994) (defining property included in the augmented estate). Gener-
ally, the augmented estate is the sum of the decedent's probate estate, in addition to all
property passed through the exercise or non-exercise of a general power of appointment
held by the decedent, property passed through will substitutes utilized by the decedent,
and property gratuitously transferred by the decedent within the previous two years. Id.
§§ 2-202 (b)(1)-(2).
The new estate recovery provision authorizes states to recover funds from all of these
sources, to the extent of Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of the decedent. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396p(b)(4)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 1993). Accordingly, some states subject to recovery not
only funds passed outside of the probate estate, but also transfers made up to two years
prior to the decedent's death. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, supra, at §§ 2-202(b)(1)-(2).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
199. § 1396p(b)(3). Although the Secretary has yet to promulgate regulations estab-
lishing the criteria to be used in determining whether estate recovery would result in an
undue hardship, the House Committee Report states that the Committee intends:
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D. Effectively Precluding Expansion of Integrated Long-Term Care
Insurance Programs
The final important provision in the new law concerns private long-
term care insurance policies. 20  Prior to OBRA '93 some states had es-
tablished programs granting asset protection and Medicaid benefits to in-
dividuals who had purchased long-term care insurance and exhausted
their policy benefits. 20 1 OBRA '93 frustrates the expansion of these inte-
grated insurance programs, however, by requiring states to implement es-
tate recovery mechanisms for individuals receiving benefits under such an
arrangement, thereby obviating the principal purpose of these integrated
programs.20 2
III. OBRA '93-MEDICAID PLANNING MADE MORE DIFFICULT BUT
No LESS ATTRACTIVE
Certainly, OBRA '93 "provides greater assurance that individuals with
substantial personal assets [will] pay a fair share for nursing home care
. . .before they qualify for Medicaid. 20 3 From simple definitional
changes 20 4 to more comprehensive operational changes 205 in the law,
[T]he Secretary should provide for special consideration of cases in which the
estate subject to recovery is (1) the sole income-producing asset of survivors
(where such income is limited), such as a family farm or other family business, or
(2) a homestead of modest value or (3) other compelling circumstances. The
Committee also expects the Secretary to provide guidance to States on how to
address situations where recovery is not waived and beneficiaries of the estate
from which recovery is sought wish to satisfy the State's recovery claim without
selling a non-liquid asset subject to recovery.
H.R. REP. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
378, 536.
200. § 1396p(b)(1)(C)(i).
201. California, Connecticut, Indiana, and New York provided such programs. See
REGAN, supra note 127, at 10-138.
202. § 1396p(b)(1)(C)(i) specifically provides:
In the case of an individual who has received (or is entitled to receive) benefits
under a long-term care insurance policy in connection with which assets or re-
sources are disregarded [under an approved State plan] . , . the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate on account of medical assist-
ance paid on behalf of the individual for nursing facility and other long-term care
services.
Id. Clause (ii) of this section specifically exempts states with pre-existing approved plans.
§ 1396p(b)(1)(C)(ii); see infra notes 255-61 and accompanying text (commenting that this
provision undermined the most viable option for long-term care financing).
203. See Hearings, supra note 16, at 334 (quoting an unnamed source).
204. Among the most important of these simple definitional changes is the change from
measuring "resources" to looking at "assets" when determining Medicaid eligibility, see
discussion supra part II.A.1, and the abandonment of the concept of Medicaid qualifying
trusts to determine the availability of funds, see discussion supra part lI.A.3.a.
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Congress has made it significantly more difficult for financially secure in-
dividuals to "cheat" their way onto Medicaid.2 °6 In several ways, how-
ever, OBRA '93 is unsatisfactory. At the most basic level, several
technical loopholes remain within the law and must be addressed.20 7
More importantly, though, OBRA '93 failed to provide fundamental
changes in the long-term health care financing system.2"8 In fact, OBRA
205. The most prominent operational changes in the law include extending the look-
back period for outright transfers of assets, see discussion supra part II.A.2, clarification of
the rules regarding jointly held assets, see discussion supra part II.A.2.a, and requiring the
use of cumulative rather than concurrent penalty periods of ineligibility for fraudulent
transfers, see discussion supra part II.B.
206. The term "cheat" is intended to draw attention to the fact that, as Jane Bryant
Quinn has noted, "[w]hen people with money sneak onto any of the other welfare pro-
grams, they're called 'welfare cheats.' If they sneak onto Medicaid, they're called 'savvy.'"
Quinn, supra note 83, at H3.
Nonetheless, this double standard may be warranted. See infra text accompanying notes
247-54 (describing how the predicament faced by many elderly essentially forces them to
utilize Medicaid planning). The elderly truly are victims of the shortage of long-term
health care planning options. Id. The shortage of planning options places many elderly
persons in a situation where Medicaid Estate Planning is their only rational choice. Id. In
this light, Medicaid Estate Planning indeed may deserve to be viewed differently than
other forms of "welfare cheating." See Paul R. Willging, Financing Long-Term Care in
America Poses a Major Challenge to Society, FED'N OF AM. HEALTH SYS. REV., Jan./Feb.
1988, at 47 (noting that elderly people are "forced" to rely on Medicaid). While this may
seem an unpalatable distinction, it is a distinction inherent in the incentive-based proposal
put forth in this Comment. See discussion infra part IV (suggesting that Medicaid Estate
Planning can be eradicated only by creating more appealing alternatives for individuals to
finance their long-term care).
207. Most prominent among these loopholes are the ease with which an individual may
circumvent the statutory 60-month look-back period for transfers from trusts to a third
party, subjecting the transfer to only a 36-month look-back by using himself or herself as a
"middle-man," and a similar loophole created by the interaction of the unlimited penalty
period and a look-back period capped at 36 months. See supra notes 98-99 and accompa-
nying text.
The slight extension of the 30-month look-back period to 36-months perpetuates the
most significant loophole in the law. At this most basic level, it is arguable that OBRA '93
merely forces Medicaid applicants to plan 180 days earlier to fraudulently qualify for Medi-
caid. See discussion supra part II.A.1 (noting the extension of the look-back period).
208. See Strauss, supra note 113, at 31 (noting that "the new law was enacted for budg-
etary reasons without regard to the basic problem older and disabled persons face in pay-
ing for long-term care"). Clearly, Congress failed to make fundamental changes to the
Medicaid program, in part, because they expected to address long-term health care needs
through the separate on-going efforts to reform the nation's health care system. See H.R.
REP. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 187, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 514 (stat-
ing that "[tihe Committee recognizes that it will be considering the President's health re-
form proposal later this year, and that this legislation will significantly impact the . . .
Medicaid program[ ]. As a result, the Committee has not recommended any fundamental
changes in the benefits or eligibility of these programs"). Under the Clinton health care
reform proposal, however, the Medicaid program would have continued to pay for the
nursing home expenses of the elderly without significant changes. See Strauss, supra note
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'93 actually proves to be a step in the direction away from the most prom-
ising avenue for effectively ending this form of "Middle Class Welfare."
A. Technical Analysis of the Recent Changes
1. Disentangling the Inconsistent Treatment of Revocable and
Irrevocable Trusts
The treatment of irrevocable trusts in OBRA '93 has been character-
ized as "clearly the product of midnight drafting done by the four horse-
man [sic] of the apocalypse. '20 9 It has been criticized as a section of the
Act in which "[m]ore questions are created rather than resolved .... 210
Notwithstanding some apparent drafting errors that should be corrected
through amendments or regulations, however, these provisions do estab-
lish effective and comprehensive rules for the treatment of irrevocable
trusts.211
The statute extends the look-back period for most transfers of assets to
thirty-six months. 212 According to the precise language of the law, how-
ever, the look-back period for transfers into a trust is sixty months.213
This clearly is the result of a printing error.214
Any transfer of assets into this type of trust essentially is equivalent to
an outright transfer of assets (for which the look-back period is thirty-six
months), because the assets become, by definition, unavailable to the ap-
plicant.21 5 Thus, there is no apparent reason that Congress would have
intended for a sixty-month look-back period to apply to transfers into
such trusts. In fact, it seems that instead of providing for a sixty-month
look-back period for payments into a trust from which no distribution
could be made to the applicant, Congress actually meant for this provi-
sion to apply to payments made from a revocable trust to an individual
other than the donor.21 6 This construction of the statute would create
113, at 31 (noting that while Medicare would have been expanded to cover some home and
community-based care, Medicaid would still cover nursing home costs).
209. See Strauss, supra note 113, at 31 (providing examples of the typographical errors
in the law).
210. See Forster, supra note 104, at 4 (stating that only a few points are clear from the
rules).
211. See Schlesinger & Scheiner, supra note 74, at 78 (stating that, while under the
language of the previous law it was arguable that corpus from an "income only" irrevoca-
ble trusts should not be considered available, under the broad language of the new statute
it would be risky to rely on such reasoning).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
213. § 1396p(c)(B)(i).
214. See Strauss, supra note 113, at 3 (suggesting that this inconsistent treatment is the




consistent look-back periods for similar payments made from either revo-
cable or irrevocable trusts.217
Therefore, it appears that the law will require technical amendments to
clarify some aspects of the new rules.218 It is likely that the look-back
period for payments made into irrevocable trusts which bar distribution
to the applicant will be lowered to thirty-six months, consistent with the
period for other outright transfers of assets.219 Presumably, the look-
back period for payments from an irrevocable trust not made to or for the
benefit of the applicant will be extended to sixty months, consistent with
the period for similar transfers from revocable trusts.
220
2. An Unlimited Penalty Period of Ineligibility-Congress Closes a
Major Loophole ... Halfway
OBRA '93 effected another significant change from the prior law by
removing the thirty-six-month ineligibility period cap for fraudulent
transfers.22' Under the new law, the period of ineligibility is determined
by dividing the amount transferred by the average monthly cost of care,
with no limit on the length of the penalty.222
While this change makes it somewhat more difficult to arrange impov-
erishment, a major planning loophole remains in the law.223 For example,
in a state with an average monthly cost of $4,000, an individual who trans-
fers $200,000 outright would be ineligible for fifty months if she applied
for Medicaid. 224 However, the look-back period is only thirty-six months
for this transfer.225 Therefore, if this individual waits to apply for Medi-
217. Id.
218. See id. at 3 (maintaining that the inconsistencies are the result of drafting errors).
219. See Harry S. Margolis, More On OBRA-93: A Wash in a Sea of Uncertainty, THE
ELDERLAW REP., Oct. 1993, at 2; see also Strauss, supra note 113, at 7 (concurring in this
opinion).
220. See Margolis, supra note 219, at 2.
221. See discussion supra part II.B (discussing the ineligibility period for fraudulent
transfers).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(E) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
223. See Barbara J. Collins, Recent Changes in Federal Medical Assistance Law, in
ELDER LAW INSTITUTE 1994: REPRESENTING THE ELDERLY CLIENT OF MODEST MEANS,
123, 127 (PLI Est. Plan. & Admin. Course Handbook Series No. D-235, 1994) (discussing
this change as "a trap for the unwary"). While Collins views the change as making the
prior loophole "half-closed," this Comment discusses it from the viewpoint of remaining
"half-open."
224. The amount transferred ($200,000) divided by the average cost ($4,000) equals 50.
225. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993) (uncapping the potential penalty
period of ineligibility); see also discussion supra part II.B (discussing the ineligibility period
for fraudulent transfers).
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caid until the look-back period expires, she would avoid fourteen months
of ineligibility.226
Congress could have prevented this situation by commencing the pe-
riod of ineligibility on the date of application rather than on the date of
the transfer.227 OBRA '93, however, still commences the period of ineli-
gibility on "the first day of the first month during or after which the assets
have been transferred. 228 Congress considered a proposal for commenc-
ing the period of ineligibility at the time of application,229 but the Confer-
ence Committee failed to adopt the Senate bill section containing this
change.23° Thus, in OBRA '93, as in past changes in the Medicaid laws,
Congress merely narrowed the loophole, rather than eliminating it.
3. Correctable Flaws In The Estate Recovery Provisions
The broad estate recovery provisions enacted as part of OBRA '93
could substantially limit Medicaid planning and allow the government to
recoup a large amount of public funds spent on individuals.231 Nonethe-
226. See Strauss, supra note 113, at 3, 7. A simple rule of thumb for this calculation is:
if the uncompensated value of the assets transferred is greater than 36 times the average
monthly cost of care, it would be unwise to apply for Medicaid until the look-back period
has expired. Id.
227. Indeed, the committee hearings on these provisions demonstrated clearly that this
result would occur. See Hearings, supra note 16, at 444 (statement of Vincent J. Russo,
President, National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys (NAELA)). It is important to note
that NAELA, while pointing out this loophole, actually opposed altering the penalty pe-
riod to commence at the time of transfer. Id. at 443. Nonetheless, this loophole still could
have been narrowed further by extending the look-back period beyond 36 months.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(D) (Supp. V 1993).
229. S.2264, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 13611(a)(1)(D)(1993).
230. Compare id. with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(D) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). No mention
of this provision appeared in the House Committee Report or the Conference Committee
proceedings. See generally Hearings, supra note 16; see also H.R. REP. No. 103-111, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 206-09 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 387, 533-36; H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 103-213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 834-35 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1088, 1523-24.
In addition, it is important to note that the House Committee hearings on the Medicaid
provisions of OBRA '93 were held without members knowing the details of the actual
proposal. See Hearings, supra note 16, at 333-34 (statement of Chairman Waxman)
(deadpanning that although the Clinton Administration had been able to state exactly how
much money would be saved by these provisions, they failed to articulate the details of
how they intended to accomplish this feat). Those testifying before the Committee were
unable to analyze the legislation and comment on any certain provisions. Id. Rather, their
role was limited to suggesting what should be included in a bill that already had been
drafted without their input. Id. Thus, in a sense these hearings may be helpful only for
future amendments.
231. See Hearings, supra note 16, at 348 (statement of Gerald Rohlfes) (noting that
California alone recovers approximately $21 million per year at a cost of $2.5 million using
35 employees and a mandatory estate recovery system).
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less, by defining the property that states may reach as that "in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, 232 Congress
may have precluded broad estate recovery.233 At the time of death an
individual ceases to have legal title or interest in property she held in
joint tenancy, jointly with a right of survivorship, or in a life estate.234
Therefore, this provision will not increase estate recovery.
2 35
Still, if Congress provides a technical correction or if courts actively
interpret this section as meaning "immediately before death," this defini-
tional change could substantially increase the amount of money recov-
ered.236 Indeed, these recovery provisions could allow assets that the
current law exempts to be levied against by the state following the death
of the recipient.237
B. A Public Policy Analysis of OBRA '93-Congress Fails to Address
the Cause of Medicaid Planning
Although most public coverage of Medicaid planning focuses on ethical
questions,231 it simply will not be possible to stop Medicaid planning by
convincing people that it is morally wrong.239 In this sense, ethical con-
siderations are irrelevant from a policy standpoint. Accordingly, this
Comment purposely does not address the ethical propriety of Medicaid
Estate Planning.24 °
232. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
233. See Strauss, supra note 113, at 31 (asserting and elaborating on this point).
234. Id.
235. See id. (maintaining that the statute may have excluded the property interests that
Congress intended to encompass).
236. See id. (explaining that this change could come from a technical amendment or
court interpretations).
237. For example, under this language the recipient's home, which is an exempt asset
for the purposes of establishing Medicaid eligibility, could be levied against to the extent of
the recipient's ownership interest. See Schlesinger & Scheiner, supra note 74, at 80.
238. See, e.g., Fein, supra note 16, at 39 (noting that the growth of Medicaid planning
"has prompted an intense ethical debate over whether people with money should benefit
from a medical program intended for the poor"); Jeffrey L. Soltermann, Medicaid and the
Middle Class: Should the Government Pay for Everyone's Long-Term Health Care?, 1
ELDER L.J. 251, 276-77 (1993) (stating that "a major piece of social engineering-the con-
version of a need-based program for the poor to a more universal entitlement program-is
underway in this country, and lawyers are inevitably involved. But is it right?").
239. See BURWELL, supra note 12, at 32 (stating that "[i]t will not be possible to address
the problem of Medicaid estate planning through persuasion of the elderly and their heirs
that it is "'morally wrong' ").
240. To be sure, the ethical propriety of Medicaid Estate Planning is somewhat of a
conundrum. Attorneys in the practice of Medicaid planning claim that they merely are
advising their clients with respect to what is legal, just as tax lawyers help clients minimize
their taxes. See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465
(1935), wherein Judge Learned Hand wrote his now-famous statement: "Any one may so
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Just as ethical concerns will not sufficiently deter Medicaid planning,
however, neither will incremental241 tinkering with rules and enforce-
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's
taxes." Id. Indeed, one prominent attorney has stated: "[Elvery city in America has
thousands of lawyers whose job it is to help wealthy people and corporations avoid as
much tax as legally possible. What I do is the same thing. Only I help the little people."
See Miller, supra note 197, at 588-89 (citing Andrew Bates, Golden Girls, NEW REPUBLIC,
Feb. 3, 1992, at 17).
Moreover, attorneys providing Medicaid Estate Planning services claim that by not ad-
vising a client about loopholes in the law, they may be subject to a malpractice claim. See,
e.g., Drake County Bar Assoc. v. Brumbaugh, 602 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Ohio 1992) (per
curiam) (holding that a delay in recertifying a client's Medicaid entitlement causing the
client to incur a $4,000 debt warranted a six month license suspension). Indeed, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct arguably require such assistance. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.1 (1994) (stating that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client").
Those opposed to Medicaid planning, however, claim that such schemes conflict with the
objective of the Medicaid program-to provide health care to the truly poor-and force
taxpayers to pay the medical bills of those who can afford to pay for their own care. See
supra text accompanying notes 1-3 (noting that "[t]he Medicaid program ... [is] designed
to cover a portion of the health care costs for needy persons of all ages.") (emphasis ad-
ded). But see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1994) (noting
that "[t]here is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of ques-
tionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be com-
mitted with impunity").
The futility of this debate was illustrated in 1992, when the Ohio Senate Ways and Means
Committee considered legislation revoking the licenses of attorneys who advised clients
how to transfer assets to qualify for Medicaid. Kenneth M. Coughlin, Ohio Flirts with
License Revocation, THE ELDERLAW REP., Nov. 1992, at 2. Because attorneys were advis-
ing clients about what acts are permitted by the law, it was impossible to draft language
making this practice illegal. Id.
241. "Incrementalism" refers to the government policy-making model developed by
Charles E. Lindblom. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through", 19
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 79-88 (1959). The incremental model contrasts to the rational-com-
prehensive policy-making model. Id. at 79. Under the rational-comprehensive model, de-
cision-makers clearly define the problem to be addressed, determine satisfactory levels of
addressing the problems, canvass alternatives to achieve these goals, compare those alter-
natives, and, ultimately, choose the approach that achieves the goals at the least cost.
JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 82 (1984). Under
the incremental model, policy-makers presume the propriety of the basic approach of any
policy and, therefore, make only small, incremental changes. Id. at 83; see also Lindblom,
supra, at 84 (developing this model originally). This inertial tendency results from both the
decentralized nature of our system of government and the political concerns of legislators
anathema to the potential political fallout that is concomitant to any major policy change.
See Lindblom, supra, at 85-86.
The budgetary process, within which Medicaid eligibility policy is traditionally devel-
oped, has been characterized widely as the policy endeavor most closely conforming to this
incremental model. See, e.g., AARON WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY
PROCESS ch. 2 (3d ed. 1979); Otto A. Davis, et al., A Theory of the Budgetary Process, 60
AM. POL. ScI. REV. 529, 529-47 (1966). But see John F. Padgett, Bounded Rationality in
Budgetary Research, 74 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 354 (1980) (arguing that the incremental model
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ment effectively deter the practice.24 2 In the most simple case, OBRA '93
does not apply well to the budgetary process). Indeed, the history of frequent but minor
changes in Medicaid eligibility rules exemplifies the incremental approach at work in the
budget process. See discussion supra part I.C (demonstrating implicitly that past policy
efforts have entailed merely developing stricter rules and enforcement mechanisms for po-
licing fraudulent transfers); see also Strauss, supra note 113, at 31 (noting that budgetary
concerns, not concerns for the long-term health care needs of the elderly and disabled,
drove the 1993 changes in the Medicaid laws). Moreover, it appears that the incremental
approach will continue to dominate policy-making, notwithstanding predictions like that of
the Pepper Commission more than five years ago stating that rational policy-making would
come to predominate in this area. See Marshall B. Kapp, Options for Long-Term Care
Financing: A Look to the Future, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 719, 754 (1991) (citing COOPERS &
LYBRAND, HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT Ass'N, LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE
ELDERLY IN THE 1990'S: STRUCTURE AND FINANCING 18-19 (1990) ("suggesting that the
'muddle through' incremental tinkering model will continue to dominate the national re-
sponse-or lack of response-to the eldercare financing challenge.") and John D. Rocke-
feller IV, The Pepper Commission Report on Comprehensive Health Care, 323 NEW. ENG.
J. MED. 1005 (1990) (stating that "[o]n long-term care, .... broad-based support and limited
opposition will promote consensus on action..."). Id. at 754.
Notwithstanding the predominance of incrementalism in budgetary politics, the alterna-
tive advanced in this Comment - implementing changes that would break the incremental
model by discarding the policing approach of the past in favor of an incentive-based ap-
proach for limiting Medicaid planning - is not unrealistic. See discussion infra part IV
(promoting incentive-based, integrated policies). Previous policy responses to this impend-
ing crisis have demonstrated that mere incremental refinements of the existing Medicaid
eligibility structure will be insufficient. See infra notes 242-44 (indicating that stricter rules
will merely be circumvented by more innovative planning as long as there is a lack of
dignified choices for financing long-term care). Moreover, surging demographic expansion
in both the number of elderly and the cost of care are further exacerbating the need for
swift and significant changes in the current long-term care marketplace. See Kapp, supra,
at 720-21 (noting that the elderly population is expected to nearly double between the
years 1990 and 2020 and that expenditures on long-term care will continue to rise); see also
Theresamaria Mantese & Gerard Mantese, Nursing Homes and the Care of the Elderly, 51
J. Mo. B. 155, 155 (1995) (stating that in the next 25 years, the percentage of the popula-
tion aged 65 years or older also is expected to increase from 12.6% to 16%) (citing The
Population Reference Handbook (1990), published by the Population Reference Bureau, a
non-profit demographics study group in Washington, D.C.); Erick J. Bohlman, Financing
Strategies: Long-Term Care for the Elderly, 2 ELDER L.J. 167, 168 (1994) (noting that "pro-
jections are that by 2030, 18.3% of the population will have reached that age [65]" and
providing several detailed statistics predicting different aspects of the growth in the elderly
population) (citing M. H. Hoeflich, Housing the Elderly in a Changing America: Innovation
Through Private Sector Initiative, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,2).
As experiments in several states have demonstrated, integrating Medicaid eligibility with
private long-term care insurance is the most viable policy alternative for resolving this
crisis. See infra notes 255-61 and accompanying text (describing long-term care insurance).
Under these conditions, it is possible to overcome the tendency for incrementalism and
enact fundamental changes in the long-term care financing marketplace. See generally
KINGDON, supra, at ch. 8 (theorizing that incrementalism is overcome, and significant
changes in policy are achieved, when elements of the "problem stream" and "policy
stream" are coupled).
242. Based on the adaptability that planners have demonstrated in responding to every
prior attempt to tighten the law, there is no reason to believe that the most recent en-
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merely will force the elderly to plan six months earlier.243 With regard to
the more complex changes in the law, Medicaid planners can be expected
to find other means of impoverishing their clients on paper.244 Realisti-
cally, individuals will find ways to circumvent the law as long as Medicaid
Estate Planning remains the most rational option available.245 In this
way, Medicaid Estate Planning is a symptom of a broader problem-the
lack of dignified choices for financing long-term health care.24
Under the current system, the elderly have three options for financing
long-term care.247 The first option is to purchase private long-term health
care insurance. 248 Because most individuals do not consider long-term
deavor will significantly curtail Medicaid planning. See BURWELL, supra note 39, at 2 (not-
ing that every effort to curtail Medicaid planning has been hampered by imperfect
legislation leaving loopholes in the law and a concomitant expansion in planning knowl-
edge and techniques resulting in a veritable "industry" of planning).
243. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a. Under the new law, the look-back period for
uncompensated transfers of assets is extended from 30 to 36 months. Id.
244. See Hearings, supra note 16, at 389 (statement of Steven Chies, representative of
the American Health Care Association) (observing that while tightening rules and enforce-
ment might yield some savings, planners certainly will "find other means of dealing with
those issues as they come up").
245. Id. at 351 (statement by Vincent J. Russo, President, National Academy of Elder
Law Attorneys) (observing that "the current health care system for long-term care ... tells
middle-income Americans that they must plan impoverishment since . . . it is the only
rational alternative to losing their life savings")" see also Eleanor M. Crosby & Ira M. Leff,
Ethical Considerations in Medicaid Estate Planning: An Analysis of The ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, 44 Soc. SEC. REP. SER. 897 (1994) (available on WESTLAW).
Crosby and Leff write that:
Older people expect that the money they have saved all their lives will have value
in funding their retirement and in securing the lives of their children and
grandchildren. People will not save for a lifetime in order to see those savings go
down the drain in a matter of a few months or a few years, just to save the govern-
ment some Medicaid dollars. It denies the essence of the middle class view of
American life and the American dream.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Joel C. Dobris, Medicaid Estate Planning by the Elderly: A
Policy View of Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance, 24 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
19-20 (1989)).
246. See Hearings, supra note 16, at 365 (statement of Sheldon L. Goldberg, President,
American Association of Homes for the Aging) (referring to Medicaid planning as a
"symptom[ ] of a much broader problem: inadequate access to long-term care services and
financial protection against catastrophic long-term care expenses"); see also id. at 389
(statement of Steven Chies, representative of the American Health Care Association) (re-
ferring to Medicaid planning as "one symptom" of the long-term health care financing
system).
247. For an overview of the finer points of these three options, and guidance on devel-
oping an integrated estate plan for elderly clients, see REGAN, supra note 127, § 10.19, at
10-129 to 10-130 (advocating the purchase of long-term care insurance, as opposed to
planned divestment or legitimately spending-down to Medicaid eligibility).
248. This option is the least frequently utilized-among those individuals entering nurs-
ing homes, a mere 1% are covered by private long-term health care insurance. MEDICAID
SOURCE BOOK: 1993 UPDATE, supra note 9, at 59-60.
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care financing until the need for care is imminent,249 however, private
insurance is usually cost-prohibitive. 25 ° Accordingly, a second option is
for an individual to spend-down almost all of her assets on medical care
until she is poor enough to qualify for Medicaid.25' Understandably,
most elderly seek to avoid this "impoverishment option," hoping instead
to live their final years in financial security and grant a modest legacy to
the next generation. 252 This leaves available only the third option of
Medicaid Estate Planning-divesting assets to qualify for Medicaid on
paper.253 In this way, "the elderly... [are] forced to rely on basic welfare
mechanisms to assure protection against the catastrophic costs of nursing
home services."
254
249. 2491See supra note 98 (noting that because most individuals cannot accurately an-
ticipate when they will need long-term care, they typically do not plan for care until the
need is imminent).
250. See BURWELL, supra note 12, at 34. This observation reflects two fundamental
concepts of insurance. First, the longer an individual waits to purchase insurance, the
higher his or her premiums must be for the insurer to collect enough funds over the in-
sured's lifetime for the policy to be actuarially sound. Secondly, the older a new purchaser
is, the greater the insurer's concern for adverse selection-the tendency for only those who
need care because of some impending situation to purchase insurance-and the higher the
premiums those individuals will have to pay.
251. At this point, the individual will qualify for Medicaid as medically needy. See
supra text accompanying notes 25-28 (discussing this legitimate form of spending-down
assets).
252. It is important to remember that very often the next generation themselves are
behind these decisions. See BURWELL, supra note 12, at 32 (noting that long-term health
care and estate planning decisions are typically prompted by children of the elderly). Re-
gardless of whether this decision is motivated by the applicant's concern for his or her
children, prompting by the children themselves, or the elderly individual's desire for his or
her own financial security, it remains true that many elderly seek to avoid this option.
253. In a way, this option is "only a different route to the same destination. Instead of
spending virtually all of one's resources for care, the client ... transfer[s] ... resources to
his children." REGAN, supra note 127, at 10-130.
254. Willging, supra note 206, at 47. Leaving the elderly with such a Hobson's choice is
intolerable. As Thomas Burke, Director of Communications for the New York State
Health Facilities Association, has written with eloquent simplicity, "[a]ny health care sys-
tem that requires those who need its help to go bankrupt to qualify is not a good system."
W. Thomas Burke, People Should be Planning for Long-Term Care, THE LEGISLATIVE
GAZETTE, Oct. 16, 1995, at 14 (Letter to the Editor); see also Soltermann, supra note 238,
at 278-79. Soltermann writes:
A system that requires people needing long-term care to impoverish themselves
before qualifying for assistance will have a demoralizing effect upon the middle
class. It will discourage saving because there is little point to putting aside money
which will only be eaten up by a few years of nursing home care. Any system that
so demoralizes its citizens must be 'bad.' Similarly, any system that encourages
people to hide their assets sets a dangerous precedent. If people feel they can
save thousands of hard-earned dollars by deceiving the welfare agencies, then
they will probably have fewer qualms about misstating their income to the IRS.
Id. at 277-78 (citations omitted).
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Several states previously developed policies to integrate the purchase
of long-term care insurance with Medicaid eligibility for their resi-
dents.255 Under these integrated arrangements, an individual who
purchases approved256 private long-term care insurance qualifies for
Medicaid benefits without having to spend-down or divest her assets.257
Unfortunately, OBRA '93 precludes expansion 258 of this program by spe-
cifically requiring states to include in estate recovery any assets disre-
garded as a result of an integrated plan involving private long-term health
care insurance.259 In so doing, Congress has undermined the most viable
option for achieving the dual goals of preserving the integrity of the
Medicaid system 26° and allowing people to "finish well",26' by financing
their long-term health care in a dignified manner.
255. With planning assistance from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, California,
Connecticut, Indiana, and New York have developed plans that generally rely on Medicaid
for re-insurance after an individual's private long-term health care insurance benefit has
been exhausted. REGAN, supra note 127, at 10-138.
256. State requirements for "approved" plans vary. New York requires "approved"
policies to provide at least a $100 daily nursing home benefit with a three-year coverage
period and $50 per day for home care with a six-year coverage period. Id. at 10-138 to 10-
139. New York also requires plans to provide inflation protection at 5% annually for pre-
miums until the beneficiary reaches age 80. Id. at 10-138. In addition, all policies bear a
special logo indicating that they are approved under the New York State Long-Term Care
Security Program. Id. at 10-139. Under the New York system a purchaser of an approved
plan may retain an unlimited amount of assets (but not income from these assets) and still
qualify for Medicaid. Id. at 10-138. For a detailed discussion of the New York State Long-
Term Care Security Program, see Walter Feldesman & JoAnn Canning, Long-Term Care
Insurance Helps Preserve an Estate, 2 EST. PLAN. 76 (1993).
In Connecticut, individuals who exhaust the benefit of an approved policy are eligible
for Medicaid, but may protect assets only to the extent of their benefit. REGAN, supra note
127, at 10-142. Under this arrangement, known as "dollar-for-dollar" protection, a person
with a policy limited to $300,000 in coverage would be eligible for Medicaid once he or she
has spent-down assets to $300,000. See id. For a more detailed analysis of this type of plan,
see Kevin J. Mahoney & Terrie Wetle, Public-Private Partnerships: The Connecticut Model
for Financing Long-Term Care, 40 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y. 1026 (1992).'
257. It is important to note that while resources may be protected under these plans,
income from such assets must be spent down on medical costs until the usual Medicaid
impoverishment level is reached. See REGAN, supra note 127, at 10-138 (referring specifi-
cally to the New York plan).
258. The four states that previously were granted waivers for these partnerships are
exempted from these provisions and may continue to operate their plans. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(b)(1)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 1993).
259. § 1396p(b)(1)(C)(i); see Tobin, supra note 1, at 215 (describing this as "a some-
.what surprising provision" in light of the adoption in several states of pilot programs ex-
cluding such assets from consideration).
260. See RICHARD PRICE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, No. 93-302 EPW,
MEDICAID: LONG-TERM CARE AND THE ELDERLY 39 (1993) (noting that "[p]rivate long-
term care insurance is generally considered to be the most promising private sector option
for providing the elderly additional protection for long-term care expenses"); see also Ke-
vin J. Mahoney, The Connecticut Partnership for LTC, GENERATIONS, Spring 1990, at 71-72
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IV. INTEGRATING MEDICAID WITH LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE-
AN INCENTIVE-BASED APPROACH FOR ENDING MEDICAID
PLANNING
Because Medicaid Estate Planning is very much a symptom of the
broader problem of limited long-term care financing options, the extent
to which improved or more aggressively enforced eligibility rules can pre-
vent the exploitation of Medicaid eligibility loopholes is limited.262
Rather, a comprehensive public policy response must promote progres-
(noting the success of an integrated approach in Connecticut); infra text accompanying
notes 262-70 (noting that the Medicaid Estate Planning form of Medicaid fraud can be
stopped only by creating more rational alternatives for the elderly to finance their care).
But see UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: PRO-
POSALS To LINK PRIVATE INSURANCE AND MEDICAID NEED CLOSE SCRUTINY, GAO/
HRD-90-154 (Sept. 1990) (discussing the hazards of an integrated system that does not
involve highly regulated policies).
261. The concept of "finishing well" was developed by Terry Hargrave, keynote
speaker at the 1991 American Association of Marriage and Family Therapists Annual Con-
ference. See Steven H. Hobbs & Fay Wilson Hobbs, The Ethical Management of Assets for
Elder Clients: A Context, Role, and Law Approach, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1411, 1411 n.3
(1994) (noting that " 'helping aging families finish well means helping them come to the
end of life with resolved issues so that they can empower one another with love and
trust' ") (quoting Hargrave, Tape of 1991 American Association of Marriage and Family
Therapists Annual Conference (Nov. 3, 1991)). The concept of finishing well is implicit in
the following statement by Jeffrey L. Soltermann:
If an individual has to exhaust most of the assets accumulated over a lifetime the
first time a long-term care need arises, then both the individual and spouse will
thereafter have to depend upon the faceless bureaucracy of the welfare system. If
they can retain some assets, however, then the community spouse can be finan-
cially secure, and the one needing care can retain some degree of independence
and control, even in a nursing home. Furthermore, once nursing home care is no
longer necessary, the individual can afford to return home.
Soltermann, supra note 238, at 271.
This concept of "finishing well" is intertwined with a fundamental premise of this Com-
ment-that the elderly seek the most rational alternative available for financing long-term
care. See supra notes 238-54 and accompanying text (reasoning that Medicaid Estate Plan-
ning persists because it is the most rational financing option). Ensuring that the elderly
"finish well" motivates children, family, friends, and the elderly themselves to promote
selection of the most rational alternative available. See supra note 17 (stating that Medi-
caid planning usually is prompted by an individual's children, seeking to maximize their
inheritances); see also Soltermann, supra note 238, at 273. Soltermann also rationalizes the
situation as follows:
Although this attitude seems selfish and somewhat insensitive, it is often soundly
based upon economic reality. In today's world, it is harder than ever to achieve
and maintain middle-class status .... [T]he middle class's share of the economic
pie seems to be shrinking. Consequently, a modest, middle-class inheritance may
seem to be the key to surviving in such a world-or at least easing the financial
struggle .... )
Id. But see Mark 10:25 (noting the burdens of finishing too well).
262. See supra note 246 (quoting several sources suggesting that Medicaid planning is
merely a symptom of this broader problem).
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sive and pragmatic financing options so that Medicaid Estate Planning no
longer remains the most rational option for financing long-term care. 26 3
Inasmuch as the individual crisis faced by each applicant reflects that in-
dividual's failure to plan for her own long-term health care, public policy
must more actively educate, encourage, and assist individuals in respon-
sibly planning for their own care.
Although the issue of Medicaid Estate Planning is especially com-
plex,265 as Congressman Henry Waxman has noted, "[o]nce you wade
through the maze of Medicaid eligibility rules and trust and estate law,
the issue goes to some very fundamental questions. ' 266 A comprehensive
and well-reasoned public policy should be consistent with the purpose of
the Medicaid program, limit Medicaid fraud, and remedy the problem
motivating fraud. OBRA '93 clearly respects the original purpose of the
Medicaid program-to cover some of the medical costs of needy per-
sons. 2 6 7  Moreover, the numerous changes in eligibility rules under
OBRA '93 will make it significantly more difficult to qualify for Medicaid
fraudulently. 268 The law, however, still ignores the underlying problem
263. See Soltermann, supra note 238, at 290 (concluding that "the long-term health care
crisis cannot be solved unless the public and private sectors cooperate and share the re-
sponsibility for financing the system"); see also supra text accompanying notes 253-61
(demonstrating that, under the current system, Medicaid Estate Planning is the most ra-
tional alternative for financing long-term health care).
264. Indeed as Michael Bagge has written:
While often viewed as a 'legal' problem, Medicaid eligibility for long term care is
more properly viewed as a crisis of policy making which has rendered all the
elderly poor, conventionally, nearly or fictionally. All elderly, regardless of in-
come or resources, now in fact share a common concern with the ongoing trans-
formation of the Medicaid program as the only social response to the long term
health care crisis.
Michael Bagge, The Eye of the Needle: Trust Planning, Medicaid and the Ersatz Poor, N.Y.
ST. B.J., Feb. 1992, at 14, 34; see also BURWELL, supra note 12, at i (noting one reason the
elderly utilize Medicaid Estate Planning is that public policy neither encourages nor assists
the elderly in developing financing alternatives).
265. The Supreme Court has described the structure of the Medicaid Program as
"among the most intricate ever drafted by Congress," Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453
U.S. 34, 43 (1981), and "a morass of bureaucratic complexity," Herwag v. Ray, 455 U.S.
265, 279 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Judge Friendly described the regulations devel-
oped under the Medicaid legislation as "labyrinthine," Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724,
727 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977), and noted that "there has developed a
degree of complexity in the Social Security Act and particularly the regulations which
makes them almost unintelligible to the uninitiated." Id. at 727 n.7.
266. See Hearings, supra note 16, at 334 (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman, Subcom-
mittee Chairman).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3 (stating the purpose of the Medicaid
program).
268. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text (referring to several minor changes
in the law); see also supra discussion part II.A (discussing the most significant changes in
the law).
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motivating this form of Medicaid fraud-a lack of long-term health care
planning options.269 Incorporating into the eligibility rules incentives for
individuals to purchase private long-term health care insurance is the
most viable option for addressing this problem. 270 Although long-term
health care insurance is not flawless, with effective consumer protection
standards it can serve as an effective part of an integrated long-term
health care financing system.
A. Improving Long-Term Health Care Insurance for the Benefit of
Consumers and Providers
The private long-term health care insurance industry is a relatively
new, but rapidly expanding, market.27' For both providers and consum-
ers, it contains many pitfalls. Insurance providers are concerned about
the potential for adverse selection,272 induced demand,273 and, given the
269. See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text (explaining how the elderly are
forced into Medicaid planning).
270. See Soltermann, supra note 238 at 289-90 (concluding that Congress must provide
incentives for the middle class to invest in long-term health care insurance); see also supra
note 260 and accompanying text (arguing that long-term health care insurance is the most
viable option for eradicating Medicaid planning).
271. In 1986, approximately 30 insurance providers were selling long-term care insur-
ance policies to approximately 200,000 consumers. See PRICE, supra note 260, at 39. By
1987, a Department of Health and Human Services Task Force on Long-Term Care Insur-
ance found 73 providers writing policies for 423,000 people. Id. By 1991, the Health Insur-
ance Association of America documented more than 135 providers insuring over 2.4
million people. Id.
272. "Adverse selection" refers here to the tendency for only those people who are
likely to need care to actually buy the insurance. See Bruce A. Radke, Meeting the Needs
of Elderly Consumers: Proposed Reforms for the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners' Long-Term Care Insurance Model Act, 1 ELDER L.J. 227, 232 (1993) (defining
adverse selection as "the risk that only those persons who have a greater chance of needing
long-term care will purchase the insurance") (citing Angela S. Curran, Long-Term Health
Care Insurance Challenges: Meeting the Needs of an Aging Population, 21 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
1075, 1086 (1990)). "Since few people consider buying long-term care insurance until they
are old and frail (that is, until they are at high risk of claiming the covered benefit), private
insurers cannot spread their risk over a sufficiently sizeable pool to avoid adverse selec-
tion." Kapp, supra note 15, at 748. For a more general definition and discussion of the
concept of adverse selection see ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW:
A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRAC-
TICES 14 (1988).
273. "Induced demand" is the tendency for individuals to decide to use more services
than they otherwise would because they have insurance which will cover the expense. See
Radke, supra note 272, at 232 (defining induced demand as the phenomenon "in which the
presence of insurance encourages use of the covered services when the insured would not
have used such services in the absence of insurance"); see also PRICE, supra note 260, at
39-40; ALICE M. RIVLIN & JOSHUA M. WIENER, CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY:
WHO WILL PAY? 14 (1988) (defining this concept, also known as "moral hazard," as the
premise that, once insurance coverage is provided for a particular service, insured individu-
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nature of elderly illnesses, the existence of somewhat "open-ended liabil-
ity."'274 Unfortunately, in designing policies to account for these risks,
providers have created several problems for consumers. Too often, cur-
rent policies exclude certain illnesses, restrict benefits to a low level, limit
the period of coverage, or fail to provide inflation protection.275 In some
cases, policies simply can be cost-prohibitive. 276 For these reasons, pri-
vate long-term care insurance has remained generally unattractive.
Clearly the problems faced by consumers and providers are interde-
pendent.277 The first step in solving these problems is to develop mini-
mum federal standards for long-term care policies.278 These standards
will assure consumers that they are receiving a quality product.279 The
second step is to incorporate into the Medicaid eligibility rules asset-pro-
tection incentives for individuals to purchase private insurance rather
als tend to utilize the service more frequently and often unnecessarily). This tendency also
has been more colloquially described as the "woodwork effect." See Melinda Beck et al.,
Be Nice to Your Kids, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12, 1990, at 72, 73 (noting that people would
"come out of the woodwork" to use a benefit once it is made available).
274. "Open-ended liability" means that the insurer will be paying benefits for the rest
of the insured's life. See PRICE, supra note 260, at 39-40.
275. Id. at 40.
276. See STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., 1993
GREEN BOOK, BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURIS-
DICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 263 (Comm. Print 1993) (maintaining
that many elderly persons cannot afford long-term care insurance premiums); see supra
note 250 (noting that policies often are cost-prohibitive).
277. Fundamentally, insurance involves a simple two-step process of identifying and
distributing risks. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 272, at 8-13. In exchange for a pre-
mium, an insurer agrees to be liable for certain costs associated with the identified risks.
Id. at 11. These premiums are based on actuarial calculations incorporating both the fore-
seeable cost of liability and an insurer's ability to distribute this risk among many people.
Id. at 12-13. Of course, this is a bilateral process-the degree of risk the insurer is willing
to assume is based on the established premium that the insured will pay. In this case, any
risks that the insurer does not cover are said to be retained risks. Id. at 13-14. Accord-
ingly, each insurance transaction is a bargained agreement between the insured and the
insurer that strikes a balance between these interrelated factors.
278. Several groups have advocated the development of federal standards for private
long-term health care insurance in order to guarantee uniformity among plans and protect
the consumer. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 16, at 440 (memorandum from Vincent J.
Russo, President, National Association of Elder Law Attorneys) (proposing the establish-
ment of consumer protection standards); id. at 376 (memorandum of the American Associ-
ation of Homes for the Aging) (recommending the establishment of minimum federal
standards); Long-Term Care Insurance, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 204
(1990) (testimony of Ronald D. Hagen, AMEX Life Assurance Company) (supporting the
establishment of federal minimum standards legislation as a means of encouraging further
purchase and sales of long-term health care insurance).
279. See Hearings, supra note 16, at 376 (memorandum of American Association of
Homes for the Aging) (noting that "federal minimum standards for such insurance ...
[will] protect consumers").
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than engage in Medicaid Estate Planning.28° Together, these steps will
encourage individuals to utilize private insurance to finance their long-
term care needs. As investment in private insurance increases and the
size of the risk pool expands, consumers additionally will benefit from
more affordable premiums.2 8 1
B. Integrated Long-Term Health Care Financing-A Proven Solution
to the Long-Term Health Care and Medicaid Budget Crises
An integrated approach, utilizing both private long-term health care
insurance and Medicaid re-insurance, would provide middle-income indi-
viduals with a dignified alternative to Medicaid planning. 282 Under this
type of program the poor still could rely on Medicaid to cover a portion
of their long-term care expenses.283 In fact, because Medicaid Estate
Planning should decrease under such an arrangement, more funds should
be available for care of the truly needy.284 At the same time, an inte-
grated approach would allow the middle class elderly to "finish well" by
offering a dignified and responsible means of financing long-term health
care.285 This approach would allow them to preserve a reasonable por-
tion of their assets and rely on the safety net of Medicaid for extraordi-
nary expenses.
280. See id. at 374 (declaring that "individuals who can afford to protect themselves
against the risk of long-term care should be given strong incentives to do so, while scarce
public resources are preserved for those most in need"); id. at 403-04 (statement of Steven
Chies on behalf of American Health Care Association). Mr. Chies stated:
we should encourage and enforce an expectation of personal responsibility on the
part of those with access to the means to plan for and pay for long term care.
Government must help in this effort through measures to ensure that individuals
have the information and resources they need to take on personal responsibility
for meeting their long term care needs .... AHCA's plan calls for public educa-
tion ... [and] incentives.
Id.
281. Although these steps are listed individually, they are mutually dependent. See
supra note 277 (relating these steps).
282. A "middle-income" individual is defined here as "one which has managed to accu-
mulate assets from, say, $100,000 to $400,000 or so, over and above the home." See
BURWELL, supra note 12, at 7 (emphasis in original) (quoting ALEXANDER BOVE, THE
MEDICAID PLANNING HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE ASSETS OF MASSACHU-
sETTs FAMILIES (1990)).
, 283. "Poor" in this case refers specifically to the "categorically needy" and the "option-
ally categorically eligible." See discussion supra part L.A (describing these categories).
284. See Hearings, supra note 16, at 365 (statement of Sheldon L. Goldberg, President,
American Association of Homes for the Aging) (declaring that "[flor every Medicaid dol-
lar spent on someone who divested significant resources to qualify for public assistance,
one less dollar is spent on the truly disadvantaged who literally have no other
alternatives").
285. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (describing the concept of "finishing
well" in relation to long-term health care financing options).
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Finally, an effective integrated program also could prevent potential
abuse by wealthy individuals who otherwise never would spend-down to
Medicaid eligibility.286 For example, a "dollar-for-dollar" asset protec-
tion framework would protect assets only up to the extent of an individ-
ual's benefit.287 To protect a large amount of assets under a "dollar-for-
dollar" scheme, a very wealthy individual would have to purchase insur-
ance that provides extremely high levels of benefits.2 ss In that unlikely
event, although Medicaid would cover some of the costs for this wealthy
individual, the individual's purchase of such large amounts of long-term
care insurance would greatly expand the risk pool. This would allow in-
surance benefit levels to be increased, thereby indirectly saving money
within the Medicaid program. 8 9
V. CONCLUSION
Medicaid planning has allowed many individuals, who otherwise would
not be eligible for taxpayer financed long-term health care, to qualify for
Medicaid. In response, Congress has attempted to develop Medicaid eli-
gibility rules to limit this practice. Indeed, under OBRA '93, Congress
made it more difficult for individuals to qualify for Medicaid through
planned divestiture.
Nonetheless, OBRA '93 remains inadequate on two levels of analysis.
First, the legislation failed to address several well-known planning op-
tions. Second, and more fundamentally, the legislation ignores the under-
lying problem motivating Medicaid Estate Planning-the lack of long-
term care financing options. To the contrary, by thwarting expansion of
integrated public-private partnerships for long-term care financing,
OBRA '93 tragically undermines the most viable option for addressing
this crisis. Thus, for many Americans, Medicaid Estate Planning will re-
286. Apparently, concern for abuse of this system by the very wealthy was one factor
motivating Congress to preclude the expansion of integrated plans. See PRICE, supra note
260, at 41 (noting that this was among the concerns expressed about the integrated plans
already in operation).
287. See supra note 256 (distinguishing dollar-for-dollar asset protection from unlimited
asset protection).
288. See supra note 256 (distinguishing dollar-for-dollar asset protection from unlimited
asset protection).
289. This is especially true in light of the fact that, although the health care expenses of
each wealthy individual can be expected to be no greater than that of the average person,
wealthy individuals will purchase more insurance to protect more assets. In this way they
will expand the risk pool for insurance more than the average purchaser, but will not bur-
den the Medicaid program any more than the average person.
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main the most rational method of financing long-term care, and Con-
gress' ersatz solution to the long-term health care crisis.
Shawn Patrick Regan

